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Abstract 
The presented Masters Thesis seeks do develop a better understanding of the relationship 
between American foreign aid, American foreign policy traditions, American foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, and American interests. It does so by 
answering the following questions: Theories on development typologies reveal that there are 
several ways to build a failed state, but what particular type of state building does the U.S. 
government do, and what is their reasoning for doing it? And is this consistent with its 
foreign policy? How does this relate to American foreign policy traditions and American 
interests? In order to do this I define American foreign policy traditions and American self-
interest, as well as accounting for three different development typologies: State-building, 
nation-building, and society-building. To connect these aspects of American foreign relations 
to a specific case, I analyse the American aid efforts in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, 
using American reports to OECD, accounting for Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
The data is divided according to the three typologies in order to discuss the American 
strategy when donating aid and forming foreign policy goals. The analysis and discussion of 
the thesis exposes that American aid work in Afghanistan at some points is consistent with 
American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, but also that there are conflicting elements 
between foreign policy goals and the aid effort during the years researched. The American 
foreign policy goals in Afghanistan also contain elements of at least two American foreign 
policy traditions, exposing a difference between the foreign relation strategy of the Truman 
Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine. American interests are present in all foreign policy goals and 
the aid effort in Afghanistan, but somewhat surprisingly, they are not rooted in economic 
interests; stability and safety for American citizens are the predominant American interests 
being represented when the U.S. government contributed with foreign aid in Afghanistan. 
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Introduction 
Foreign policy and foreign aid are intertwined aspects of foreign relations that can reveal 
much on the foreign profile of a state. The American foreign policy oscillates between 
isolationism and heavy intrusion on foreign land, often leading to a long-term aid effort. 
American interests are at the core of American foreign policy and is the factor that shapes the 
foreign policy of the United States. Foreign aid is also related to foreign policy and it is 
interesting to analyse that relationship because for American foreign relations there seems to 
be little difference between the two. This is especially true in the case of the post 9/11-efforts 
in Afghanistan, as the policy to go to war against terrorism has resulted in a long-term aid 
effort, which now is closely connected to new foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Theories 
on development typologies reveal that there are several ways to build a failed state, but what 
particular type of state building does the U.S. government do, and what is their reasoning for 
doing it? And is this consistent with its foreign policy? How does this relate to American 
foreign policy traditions and American interests? These are questions that will be answered in 
this thesis after giving thorough consideration of American foreign policy, types of aid, 
development theory, and quantitative analysis. 
 The thesis consists of three chapters, whereby the first is an introduction to 
methodology, theoretical framework, and important definitions. This is partly done by 
literature review to establish what American foreign policy traditions are, but also analysis of 
academic literature on several subjects, such as self-interest and foreign aid, in order to 
construct definitions that are relevant and applicable for this thesis. The second chapter 
consists of a quantitative analysis of American foreign aid to Afghanistan for the years 2007-
2012, analysing the data in relation to different variables in order to give a critical view on 
the aid efforts. The reason for doing this is to be able to discuss a specific use of aid, whereby 
Afghanistan is an interesting case because it is a failed state, meaning that there are many 
areas that needs development, creating data that are both diverse and large in size. The third 
chapter contains the main discussion, which is a discussion on the connection between the 
foreign aid analysed in the second chapter, and foreign aid traditions, foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan, and American self-interest. These are all aspects that can explain foreign aid 
priorities and therefore I find it interesting to discuss the mentioned aspects in order to be 
able to discuss American interests in Afghanistan in relation to both the specific foreign 
policy towards Afghanistan, as well as foreign policy traditions. To enable such a discussion 
it is necessary to have specific and reliable data that can indicate the actual U.S. priority in 
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states such as Afghanistan, which is the explanation for why the thorough analysis in the 
second chapter is so important. 
 
	  3	  
1 Definitions, theories, and foreign relations 
discussions 
 
 
1.1 The War in Afghanistan 
The U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were a direct consequence of the 9/11-attacks. 
President George W. Bush responded to the attacks in a speech on September 12, 2001 by 
calling the attacks “acts of war” and that the U.S. would “… use all [their] resources to 
conquer this enemy.”1 Exactly one week after the attacks, the 107th Congress wrote and 
approved of Public Law 107-40, which was a joint resolution with the intention to “… 
authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent 
attacks launched against the United States.”2 This gave the President the possibility of using 
military force against nations that may have had any connection to the attacks, and/or 
harbouring persons or organisations connected to the attacks.3 There was awareness of Al-
Qaeda being present in Afghanistan, being harboured by the Taliban government. Because 
there was no will from the Afghan government to exchange any of the Al-Qaeda members, 
this ended in the first American attacks in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.4  
 After almost two years, during which the U.S.-led forces had fought Al-Qaeda, 
NATO contributed with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF 
operations began on August 11, 2003: “Mandated by the United Nations, ISAF’s primary 
objective was to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the 
country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan would never again 
become a safe haven for terrorists.”5 This meant that several other NATO nations contributed 
with security enforcement in Afghanistan, making the efforts an international matter instead 
of an American-led operation with just a few allies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George W. Bush, "President Bush," PBS, September 12, 2001. 
2 Joint Resolution - to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the 
Recent Attacks Launched against the United States, 107th, Public Law 107-40. 
3 Joint Resolution - to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the 
Recent Attacks Launched against the United States. 
4 Ian Christopher  McCaleb, "Defense Officials: Air Operation to Last 'Several Days'," CNN, October 7, 2001. 
5 "Isaf's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)," NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm. 
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 In 2009, after becoming president, Barack Obama approved an increase of American 
troops in Afghanistan.6 Stated by Obama, “this increase is necessary to stabilize a 
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, which has not received the strategic attention, direction 
and resources it urgently requires.”7 It was understood that this was temporary and two years 
later Obama could declare that the extraction of American soldiers would start.8 December 
28, 2014 the U.S. and NATO formally ended the war in Afghanistan, leaving about 13 500 
soldiers, which from January 1, 2015 transitioned into a supporting role.9 
 
1.2 Defining foreign aid 
For this thesis the overall definition of foreign aid is based on the definition that OECD uses 
for Official Development Assistance (ODA): 
Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and 
territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (available at 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development institutions 
which are:  
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies; and  
ii. each transaction of which:  
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and  
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per 
cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)10 
The data material that is available for U.S. aid given to Afghanistan that fulfils this definition 
does not only consist of aid being given directly from USAID, but also from other U.S. 
agencies or departments. USAID has been given the task to make the reports that are 
submitted to the OECD/DAC, so there is a need to underline that the aid that will be analysed 
does not only come from USAID, but also other official U.S. government branches. As this 
thesis will use OECD’s definition of ODA, this is not a problem, but rather a strength, as I am 
able to review several official U.S. donors and their intentions instead of just USAID. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Barbara Starr, "Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase," CNN, February 18, 2009. 
7 "Obama Approves Afghanistan Troop Increase." 
8 Helen and Mark Landler Cooper, "Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 
June 22, 2011. 
9 "U.S. Formally Ends the War in Afghanistan," CBS, December 28, 2014. 
10 OECD, "Is It Oda?,"  http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf. 
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 What can be discussed further is what aspects of the aid being given that can be 
considered to be only humanitarian aspects. Aid given for infrastructure, such as roads, may 
increase the standard of living/comfort in a country, but that can only follow after basic 
needs, such as clean water, food and accommodation. Economic efficiency must come after 
having sought to deliver the basic needs. According to Giles Bolton in his book Aid and other 
Dirty Business, humanitarian aid and developmental aid must be distinguished from one 
another: 
Humanitarian aid seeks to give immediate assistance to people in desperate 
need […] The objectives are quite simple: keep people from dying and help 
them get their lives back on track. […]  Yet humanitarian relief comprises only 
5 per cent or so of the global spending on aid. […] Development aid tries to 
create the opportunities [for countries] to pull themselves out of poverty for 
the long term.11  
In that sense, the aid given by the U.S. to Afghanistan can be viewed in two different ways. 
Humanitarian aid is according to the definition given by Bolton only a fraction of the entire 
gross aid, and it is used for natural disasters or refugees, in order to keep them alive. The 
developmental aid, on the other hand, is given in order to develop. This is a long term 
investment, and it is that kind of aid that is particularly interesting, as it must be well thought 
through before implementing it, otherwise the money will probably be wasted. 
 Hans Morgenthau, an important figure for the study of international relations and an 
authority within those fields of research, has also defined six types of aid in his 1962 article 
“A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”12: Humanitarian aid, subsistence foreign aid, military 
foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development.13 
Humanitarian aid is according to Morgenthau used for the same purposes that Bolton 
describes, and is in essence non-political. At the same time, Morgenthau claims that when 
private foundations contribute with humanitarian aid, the aid is influenced by the political 
context of the country the foundations are based in.14 This means that humanitarian aid 
contributed by private foundations in essence is non-political, but the reasoning for where 
and what aid to contribute with may be influenced by the political context of the country in 
which the foundation is based. In other words, the official U.S. aid given by the government 
also tends to be non-political according to Morgenthau’s distinction. For this thesis, the main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Giles Bolton, Aid and Other Dirty Business(London: Ebury Press, 2008), 75-76. 
12 Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962). 
13 "A Political Theory," 301. 
14 "A Political Theory," 301. 
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focus will be on what Morgenthau calls aid for economic development, but that type of aid 
may involve bribery:  
Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. 
The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs 
here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be 
rendered. These bribes differ from the traditional ones [(publicly accepted and 
granted bribes/subsidisation)] in two respects: they are justified primarily in 
terms of foreign aid for economic development, and money and services are 
transferred through elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine economic aid. 
In consequence, these bribes are a less effective means for the purpose of 
purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones.15 
Simultaneously, Morgenthau claims that because of the wealth of developed nations, there is 
a universal expectation that they aid less developed and poor nations to raise their standard of 
living, “[…] aside from humanitarian aid and military foreign aid, the only kind of transfer of 
money and services which seems to be legitimate is one ostensibly made for the purpose of 
economic development.”16  
 Prestige foreign aid, which is to help underdeveloped nations with technological 
advancement and equipment, is held as a viable solution by developed industrial countries. 
But, according to Morgenthau, this is partly an illusion: “[…] virtually all underdeveloped 
nations want to appear as having achieved industrialization, while only a fraction of the 
population, and frequently only small elite groups within it, seek the social and economic 
benefits of industrialization.” 17 The effect of such technological advancement is according to 
Morgenthau mainly psychological and political and not contributing to development. Prestige 
aid is mainly beneficial for the donating nation. It builds strong relationships with the 
receiving nation because the elite, which often is a decisive actor for the receiving nation’s 
policies, is the group of people in that nation that wants to achieve a psychological and 
political advancement. Such an investment is also often cheap for the donating nation.18  
 To conclude, foreign aid in this thesis is defined as aid that fulfils the requirements 
made by the DAC for what is called ODA. For a further definition of aid that is covered by 
the description of ODA, Bolton’s division of humanitarian aid and development aid applies, 
where this thesis main focus will be on development aid. Within development aid the thesis 
will follow Morgenthau’s six types of aid, in which the main focus will be on aid for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 "A Political Theory," 302. 
16 "A Political Theory," 302. 
17 "A Political Theory," 304. 
18 "A Political Theory," 304. 
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economic development. Although that is the focus, as discussed above, aid for economic 
development can contain traces of bribery, military aid, prestige aid, etc.  
 
1.3 Defining self-interest 
Self-interest is a nonspecific term with a wide range, and therefore it needs to be defined in 
greater extent than other terms within this thesis. It is also necessary because this thesis will 
discuss American interests in relation to American foreign policy traditions, U.S. foreign 
policy, and the aid efforts in Afghanistan (2007-2012). It is necessary to justify the definition 
with political practice as policy decides the allocation of aid. At the same time, political 
practice is not necessarily consistent, and therefore it is necessary to discuss some aspects of 
American foreign policy and decisions on allocation of foreign aid to further explore the term 
self-interest. It is also necessary to make an effort to connect political practice to previous 
specific political decisions, in order to establish whether or not these decisions have created a 
precedent for later political practice. To give an exact definition for this thesis, according to 
the description above, it is necessary to present Machiavellian realpolitik, which then will be 
connected to American political practice using the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine 
will lead to arguments about how foreign aid is influenced by policy and realpolitik. After 
that it is necessary to discuss examples of foreign aid being affected by realpolitik, before 
concluding the definition of self-interest within the scope of this thesis. 
 Realpolitik stems from Niccolò Machiavelli’s book The Prince, where he gives a 
thorough description of how to best attain and preserve a principality.19 Machiavelli’s ideas is 
know today as the foundation of realpolitik, but it is important to note that his book was 
written in a different context than realpolitik is used today. Some of the principles may not 
apply to today’s modern world, which will be discussed further at a later point. The general 
idea of realpolitik described in The Prince is a strategy and not a theory.20 Realpolitik can 
arguably be said stem from realism, where realpolitik is the pragmatic strategy that one can 
use when being convinced by the traits of realism. Machiavelli thereby presents a way of 
maximizing the positive outcome of a situation according to what resources and abilities one 
have. There are several factors that influence the decisions one must take in order to become 
a “prince”, or rather a leader. These factors are not necessary to discuss for this thesis, but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Niccolò Machiavelli and Peter Constantine, The Prince, Il Principe (London: Vintage books, 2008). 
20 Jens Duus Rodin, "Amerikansk Utenrikspolitikk Og Den "Arabiske Våren" : En Teoretisk Analyse Av 
Obama-Administrasjonens Tilnærming Til Egypt, Libya Og Bahrain" (Universitetet i Oslo, 2013). 
	  	  8	  
general point is that one must consider all factors that can influence the outcome of a conflict 
in order to achieve the maximum positive outcome, which is utility maximisation. 
 Machiavelli’s view on the world of politics is that “… men are wicked and not 
prepared to keep their word to you, [therefore] you have no need to keep your word to 
them.”21 In other words, no person is exclusively good, which means that to optimize one’s 
position one must do so by acting with one’s own resources, as no other person can be 
trusted. This further underlines the modern realpolitik in the sense that the international 
political arena is anarchic, thereby it is not possible to trust another state completely and a 
state can only look out for itself. This is in many ways an egotistical practice where one’s 
own utility maximization must be the only focus and an ethical evaluation of others utility 
cannot be part of the equation, as this may prevent you from maximizing your own utility. 
Machiavelli was preoccupied with declaring that his ideas on how to attain and preserve a 
principality were realistic and practical:  
Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or 
heard of, because how one lives and how one ought to live are so far apart that 
he who spurns what is actually done for what ought to be done will achieve 
ruin rather than his own preservation.22 
With this Machiavelli meant that ideas are good as long as they are achievable, but rather 
than trying out ideas of governing, which one does not know will work, it is better to do what 
one already know is possible, underlining the pragmatic realism that is realpolitik.  
 It is fair to claim that the realpolitik that is presented in The Prince can be a guide to 
dictatorship, but the fact is that Machiavelli explained that there are several ways of attaining 
and preserving a principality.23 As one may encounter difficulties decided by Fortune, one 
may have to alter one’s strategy, which means that a prince may have to deviate from the 
original strategy that enabled him to attain a principality.24 This shows that Machiavelli was 
open for several approaches to governing strategies, proving he was not only writing a guide 
to dictatorship, as well as underlining that realpolitik is a pragmatic strategy for attaining and 
governing a state. What one may ask now is how realpolitik is connected to American foreign 
policy and foreign aid. This will be proven by discussing the criteria of the Truman Doctrine, 
derived from president Harry S. Truman’s address to the 80th Congress in 1947, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Machiavelli and Constantine, The Prince, 65. 
22 The Prince, 55. 
23 The Prince, 76. 
24 The Prince, 78. 
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contains references to both foreign policy and foreign aid, further linking the matter of 
discussion to the topic of this thesis.25 
 Truman’s address (which later formed the Truman Doctrine) was presented on the 
basis of Greece being in desperate need of economic aid in the aftermath of WWII, and as a 
consequence of Greece’s need of aid, Turkey was also in need of aid to prevent anxiousness 
in the Middle East.26 The Greek government turned to the American government for aid, 
where Truman saw this as a necessity in order for “…Greece to survive as a free nation.”27 
The focus on Greece, Turkey and other European nations to survive as free nations is of 
much importance for Truman’s argumentation for allocating foreign aid. Truman claims that 
a militant minority threatens the stability of the Greek society, as well as devastation after the 
war, but more importantly that the militant minority is “… lead by Communists.”28 American 
fear of communism was at large after WWII as the Soviet Union grew and gained power 
within several former sovereign states in Europe, but also reaching parts of the Middle East. 
The main goal of aiding Greece was to help it “… become a self-supporting and self-
respecting democracy”.29 The keywords one can take from Truman’s address are thus liberty, 
democracy, and the fight against communism. To help Greece and Turkey obtain this Truman 
believed that the “… help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is 
essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”30 In other words, foreign aid 
was essential for the American ability to influence and aid European states to economic 
progress and political detachment from communism. 
 The Truman Doctrine contains aspects of liberty, democracy, foreign aid, and the 
fight against communism. The initial address to the Congress formed a consensus for 
American foreign policy, as well as how and why to allocate foreign aid to several European 
and Asian countries. To link the Truman Doctrine to realpolitik it is necessary to carefully 
analyse the wording of Truman’s address, as well as the attitudes toward the subject of 
discussion: 
… [It] is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on 
free peoples … undermine the foundations of international peace and hence he 
security of the United States. … It is necessary only to glance at a map to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Harry S. Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey - Address of the President of the 
United States,"(http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/index.php: Harry S. 
Truman Library and Museum, 1947). 
26 "Recommendation for Assistance," 1-3. 
27 "Recommendation for Assistance," 1. 
28 "Recommendation for Assistance," 2. 
29 "Recommendation for Assistance," 2. 
30 "Recommendation for Assistance," 4. 
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realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave 
importance in a much wider situation.31 
Truman speaks of the problem in a more informal way than if he meant to convince the 
Congress of an ideology. He states the state of the matters to be simply what they are, and 
provides a simple, and what is believed to be an efficient solution. Realpolitik is, as 
previously stated, a pragmatic political strategy (pragmatic realism) that seeks utility 
maximization. In order for the U.S. to have stable trading partners after WWII they were 
dependent on maintaining free, democratic states which were able to withstand communism; 
American capitalism would not be able to thrive if communism was able to spread to the 
Western European states. Although the political fight against communism was an important 
factor, the keywords liberty and democracy from Truman’s speech arguably exposes an 
ideology. 
 Truman saw the best way of preventing the spread of communism, and to spread their 
own ideology instead, to be economic contribution through developmental aid. But 
contributing with aid was not enough:  
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced 
American administrators, economists, and technicians to insure that the 
financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a 
stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public 
administration.32 
By assisting the Greek government with foreign aid, the U.S. government would be able to 
influence the economic direction the Greek society was going to take. They could effectively 
and easily influence Greece to become a capitalistic society, creating both an economic and 
political partner in the South-East of Europe. The political decision thereby became an easy 
one to take, as it would further American interests, which is a pragmatic decision. This 
supports the claim that American foreign policy under Truman followed a realpolitik 
strategy. The political strategy for foreign policy during Truman’s presidency could allegedly 
have been established as the standard strategy for foreign policy since. 
 How do realpolitik and the Truman Doctrine connect with American self-interest? 
The Truman Doctrine sought to enable a firm defence against communism by aiding 
European and Asian countries both economically and bureaucratically. It also sought to 
create a free capitalist market that was able to be a trade partner with the American economy, 
as well as having political allies within certain geographical areas. Using realpolitik as a 	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political strategy furthered all these American interests, whereby utility maximization and 
pragmatism are the most prominent aspects. For this thesis this fits well as arguments for the 
definition of self-interest, because the Truman Doctrine used foreign aid as an instrument to 
fulfil American interests. Within the scope of this thesis self-interest deals with bilateral 
relationships, where the American government contributes with development aid. In general 
then, self-interest falls within the category of aid that is not allocated directly to humanitarian 
purposes. This category is difficult to divide into subcategories, as self-interest must fulfil 
criteria that give the spending of that particular money an advantage for the U.S. government, 
which can be exemplified with economic advantages and tactical military advantages. An 
economic advantage could, for instance, be getting a good deal on oil reserves, creating a 
possible trade partner for the future, creating an export market, etc. Tactical military 
advantages can i.e. be the opportunity to set up American military bases on foreign land, 
having a partner in conflict areas, etc. Previous examples of these two can both be found in 
the Marshall Plan: Getting Western Europe back on its feet meant having an export market as 
well as stable allies when confronting communism. The U.S. i.e. had (and still has) storage 
facilities in Norway for military equipment such as weapons, vehicles, etc.33 
 In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William Appleman Williams discusses the 
relationship between American economics and American politics. Williams’ example is the 
relationship between the United States and Cuba. The economic and diplomatic pressures on 
Cuba lead to the revolution. American leaders were not deliberately harsh on Cuba: 
 They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed, and they were sincere in 
arguing that their policies and actions would ultimately create a Cuba that 
would be responsibly self-governed, economically prosperous, and socially 
stable and happy. All, of course, in the image of America.34 
The final sentence in Williams’ description of why American leaders acted as they did 
towards Cuba is a central point to his arguments. American bilateral relations are in most 
cases based on promoting American interests, particularly when investing economically. 
Williams also argues for the existence of elitism within the executive branch in the U.S., 
claiming that a narrow-sighted approach to international relations caused the revolution on 
Cuba, as American leaders were not capable of considering what the citizens on Cuba 
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wanted. American leaders saw only one solution; form ‘new’ Cuba in the same mould as the 
U.S.35  
 Williams argues further that American policy is guided by three conceptions, where 
the first two are a “… humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their problems [and] 
the principle of self-determination applied at the international level.”36 The third conception, 
on the other hand, is contradictory to the first two as it is an “… idea entertained by many 
Americans [where] one insists that other people cannot really solve their problems and 
improve their lives unless they go about it the same way as the United States.”37 This is 
contradictory in the sense that controlling the process of improvement is not merely based on 
a wish to give humanitarian help; it is rather based on a wish to form other countries in the 
same way as the United States, thereby also being contradictory to the aspect of self-
determination.38 This culminates in American economic imperialism: There is a belief that 
American “… domestic well-being depends upon such sustained, ever-increasing overseas 
economic expansion.”39 In other words, the expansion of the American economy is presented 
as vital to achieve and maintain American domestic affluence. In that sense, it is not 
necessarily American economic imperialism, but rather American expansionism.  
 To further understand why the American government see a need to impose their 
values on other states, it is necessary to explain what Williams describes as Weltanschauung: 
“a ‘definition of the world combined with an explanation of how it works.’”40 In other words, 
the Weltanschauung used by Williams is a description of how the American government 
views the world and how its decisions reflect that view. Andrew J. Bacevich, who has written 
the afterword of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, points out some of the main points of 
Williams’s Weltanschauung: 
An insistence that American values are universal values[;] … A self-serving 
commitment to the principle of self-determination[;] … A penchant for 
externalizing evil[;] … A reflexive predilection for demonizing adversaries[;] 
… A belief that the American economy cannot function absent opportunities 
for external expansion and that the American political system cannot function 
absent prosperity[;] … A steady, if unacknowledged drift toward 
militarization[;] … An unshakable confidence in American Exceptionalism 
and American beneficence[.]41 	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Most of these main points are rather self-explanatory, but some need more explaining as they 
stand in Bacevich’s afterword. The point about self-determination is simply Williams’s 
opinion that the U.S. expects other states to self-determine their way of operating in the same 
manner as the U.S. The point on externalizing evil is regarding the U.S. government 
believing domestic issues are related to issues abroad, thereby letting foreign policy being 
influenced by domestic policy. All in all, the main point of Williams’s concept of the 
American Weltanschauung is the glorification of American society, meaning that every other 
way of governing is not as good as the American way. This idea is combined with an 
economic strategy which links domestic issues to external issues, leading to a constant need 
of intervening in foreign affairs as they influence both the American society as well as 
American economy. This concludes why the American government constantly sees a need to 
impose itself on other states’ affairs. 42 American foreign policy in light of its traditions is 
discussed further in section 1.8 (below). 
 As a consequence of the arguments above, the definition of American self-interest, 
when contributing with foreign aid, must be rooted in foreign aid that is allocated for other 
purposes than pure humanitarian help (clean water, food, tents, etc.), in which it fulfils a goal 
of the political strategy used by the U.S. government. Such goals may be economical, 
political or military, but the military aspect falls outside of the range of this thesis. 
Determining what is self-interest may prove to be a challenge as self-interest arguably always 
is present when contributing with foreign aid, but at the same time it is not necessarily a 
determined goal. Contributing with foreign aid may increase a state’s reputation on the 
international political arena, as well as give state leaders a satisfaction by contributing outside 
of their constituted domain. Donating money to underdeveloped states may have 
consequences one can only identify after the aid has been used. The donating government 
may gain benevolence with the receiving government: The donating government may expect 
favours, economic trades, commitments to international political issues, etc. Within the 
boundaries of this thesis, identifying self-interest must be a process on the level of large 
unspecific goals such as increasing the level of freedom and democracy. 
 
1.4 Why do governments contribute with foreign aid? 
In order to discuss why governments contribute to foreign aid, one must review what purpose 
the aid serves for the donating governments. According to Carol Lancaster in Foreign Aid: 	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Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, foreign aid “… began as a realist response to 
the deepening Cold War between East and West … eventually [creating] the basis for a new 
norm in relations between states.”43 In other words, foreign aid’s existence as an institutional 
element as we know it today stems from the first years after WWII, starting particularly with 
the Marshall Plan, both helping Western European countries, as well as giving these countries 
an incentive to support the U.S. during the Cold War. Lancaster focuses on four main 
purposes for foreign aid: Diplomacy, development, humanitarian relief, and commercial 
purposes.44 Development “… has been both a means and an end of policy” in two ways, 
namely to promote peace and democracy, as well as promoting a higher standard of living for 
poor states.45 Aid for humanitarian relief is typically focused on disasters and times of crisis, 
and has as previously established by Morgenthau, the least controversial purpose as well as 
being the kind of aid that most often does not include traces of self-interest. The commercial 
purposes’ focus lies mainly on economy, whereby “… the expansion of a country’s exports 
and securing access to needed raw materials imports” seem most significant to Lancaster.46  
 Lancaster also discusses domestic political forces that shapes foreign aid, and has 
divided these forces into four categories: Ideas, political institutions, interests, and the 
organisation of aid (within the government).47 The organisation of aid goes off topic for this 
thesis and is not relevant. When looking at ideas, Lancaster focuses on two categories in 
particular, namely worldviews and principled beliefs.48 Principled beliefs originate from 
worldviews as worldviews contribute to what arguably are constructed norms, such as “… 
governments of rich countries should provide aid to poor countries.”49 Institutions as a 
category refers to political institutions such as voting rules, the political system 
(parliamentary or presidentially system), and the role of legislators, and the effect they have 
on the aid-giving.50  
 The organisation of the political system affects the number of political parties running 
for election, where the parliamentary system often results in more than two parties, while the 
presidential system often results in two parties. This can have an impact on aid-giving in the 
sense that fewer small parties have both differences and similarities, but also may take the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Policy(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 212. 
44 Foreign Aid, 13. 
45 Foreign Aid, 13-14. 
46 Foreign Aid, 14. 
47 Foreign Aid, 18. 
48 Foreign Aid, 19. 
49 Foreign Aid, 18-19. 
50 Foreign Aid, 19. 
	  15	  
form of niche-parties whereby several of them may have a political agenda that focuses on 
development. A focus on development in today’s globalised world will often result in a focus 
on global development, because the development of one country and its standard of living is 
linked to the global market. Rich countries may focus on themselves and increase the 
standard of living to a certain level, but they are inevitably dependent on other countries 
when it comes to raw materials and resources that are not attainable within the borders of 
their own country. Another argument for such wealthy countries to contribute to development 
with aid is the wealthy citizens chance to focus on others that do not have what is considered 
basic needs or rights. Interests as a domestic political force is by Lancaster divided into three 
sub-categories: 
… those supporting commercial purposes of aid[;] … nongovernmental 
organizations and public interest groups that support aid for relief, 
development, and related purposes[;] … and groups with an affinity for 
particular foreign countries, ethnicities, or religious orientations that support 
aid directed to those groups and countries.51 
Out of these three categories, what seem to be most interesting for this essay is particularly 
those supporting commercial purposes of aid. Economic agreements between a wealthy state 
and a poor state on import/export can give large economic advantages for both, but in 
particular for the wealthy country, which may be able to import cheap raw materials as part 
of the agreement. This creates a large incentive for wealthy states to give aid to poor states, 
but only if they are able to come to terms with an exploitive trade agreement.  
 Summarising the aspects from Lancaster’s book above, one may claim the reason for 
governments to contribute with foreign aid is not just one reason, but a combined effect of 
several reasons. The idea is that the social construction of an ethically focused worldview 
creates incentive for rich countries to aid to poor countries. At the same time, the economic 
interests combined with the global economy contribute with yet another incentive to 
contribute to foreign aid. The global society today is also intertwined with regard to political 
aspects, thus aid-giving states may be able to form bonds with states within important tactical 
areas (geopolitics), as well as being areas with vital resources. Finally, democratic states have 
an incentive to give aid to authoritarian states when there is hope of leading them on a path to 
become democratic, thus producing better conditions for a more peaceful global society. 
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1.5 Theoretical framework: Typology of State-building 
When reviewing the American aid efforts to Afghanistan from 2007-2012 there is a need for 
a framework which makes it possible to analyse the money flow. The intention of analysing 
the aid flow from the U.S. to Afghanistan is to identify the root cause of why aid is given, as 
well as to identify what U.S. self-interest the aid serves. The root cause here refers to the 
tactics of state-building, nation-building, or society-building. These three categories may 
intertwine, but at the same time they serve separate specific purposes that will be discussed 
later on. This thesis will not discuss the success of state-/nation-/society-building, but rather 
try to identify which of these three categories that the U.S. aid efforts seem to be related to. 
 First of all, in literature on state-building and nation-building, these two terms are 
being used interchangeably. The term nation-states may be the source of this, but in the 
contemporary world the nation-state is not limited to a common identity derived from 
common ancestry and culture, but it is the form that modern democracies have taken 
regarding the political situation, institutions, bureaucracy, etc. As will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs, the nation-building efforts are aimed at building a national identity, 
while a state-building effort mainly is aimed at building the state apparatus. Thereby the 
interchangeable use of the terms cannot apply for this thesis. This is mainly a statement made 
to remove possible misunderstandings about the use of the terms. They will be properly 
defined in the following paragraphs, removing any confusion regarding the terms. First I will 
define what state-building is, before moving on to nation-building and society-building. 
 Jonathan Monten, describes state-building, particularly in U.S. context, as “… 
attempting to create stable, self-sustaining democratic governments in foreign countries that 
can survive the withdrawal of external support.”52 Monten more specifically focuses on the 
scope and strength of the state, as well as the connection between state-building and 
democracy.53 Mark T. Berger defines nation-building similarly in his article “From Nation-
Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-State System and 
the Changing Global Order”: 
Nation building (or state-building) is being defined here as an eternally driven, 
or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes 
democratic, government over an internationally recognised national territory 
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against the backdrop of the establishment and consolidation of the UN and the 
universalization of a system of sovereign nation-states.54 
What seems to be a reoccurring factor is the focus on establishing stable governments, 
whether the goal is to be able to withdraw external support or not. Berger does not focus on 
the scope and the strength of the state, but Francis Fukuyama shares Monten’s focus on this. 
Fukuyama argues that the scope of the state is the reach of the institutions and bureaucracies 
within the state, while the strength is the ability to “… plan and execute policies, and to 
enforce laws cleanly and transparently.”55 Fukuyama particularly focuses on coercion, the 
monopoly of legitimate violence, claiming that this is vital in order to create a stable 
society.56 
 The importance of monopoly of force in order to create stability is understandable, 
because both the ability and opportunity of sanctioning gives the citizens an incentive to 
follow the laws or regime policies that are created in order to avoid punishment. The issue of 
coercion is that it does not necessarily have to be legitimised by election or a general vote 
from the citizens. When looking at the citation from Berger’s article above he argues that the 
resulting government when performing state-building is not necessarily democratic, but that 
is sometimes can be. Thus, there are no criteria for the citizens to legitimise coercion as part 
of the state-building process. This may result in an authoritarian regime and in last 
consequence dictatorship. Thereby state-building does not necessarily consider the rights of 
the citizens as it is merely focusing on the state apparatus and the ability to create stability, 
which differs from nation-building. 
 To create stability and developing a state or territory using the strategy of nation-
building, focuses on establishing a national identity for the citizens, which differs from state-
building. Jochen Hippler explains that nation-building was previously linked to de-
colonisation, while in modern times regained focus after the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
“… states have been falling apart, not just in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 
while other states are being created, reinvented and recognized.”57 This can be explained as a 
consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union, where several former sovereign states got new 
opportunities to form their state anew. This is a time-consuming process that cannot be 
rushed. Already established nation-states, such as those of Western Europe, have had a long 	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time to evolve, while unstable or failed states need time to create and legitimise a national 
identity.  
 There are three processes that according to Hippler are key to the nation-building 
process: “creation of an integrated ideology[;] creation of an integrated society[;] creation of 
a functioning state apparatus.”58 The creation of an integrated ideology can better be 
understood as a creation of a national identity, which can unify the different groups within 
the territory of the nation-state up for discussion. It is important to emphasise that these 
groups do not necessarily need to loose their identity, but rather that they have to agree that 
they have something in common, which must surpass the different group identities.59 This is 
necessary in order to create a state that is stable, as well as increase the peacefulness between 
different groups. The next step is the creation of an integrated society, which reflects the 
practical conditions that need to be established. In short term these practical conditions are 
infrastructure in the form of transportation (e.g. roads), long distance communication 
(including media outlets), and an integrated national economy.60 These requirements cannot 
only exist, but must “… be utilized to a significant degree.”61 The third step, creating a 
functioning state apparatus, is the step where the creation of a nation-state comes in. The first 
two steps merely create a national identity by using infrastructure such as communication in 
order to be able to discuss and agree on the identity. Building the state has two intertwined 
aspects: First, the “… respective society has constituted itself as a political identity … and 
[secondly] the state has not just to be proclaimed, but it has to be functional.”62 This implies 
that there is a need for a functional financial base, personnel loyal to the state, monopoly of 
force, a functioning legal system, being able to function in the entire territory of the state, and 
most importantly it needs acceptance by the citizens.63 In other words, there is a need for a 
self-constituted state with practical functionality, and it has to be recognized by the citizens.  
 The recognition of the citizens is a vital aspect that separates nation-building from 
state-building. While state-building mainly focuses on creating stable state functions, where 
coercion is a vital aspect, nation-building first and foremost focuses on the creation of a 
common national identity. After creating that identity there is a need for creating a state 
apparatus where monopoly of force is an aspect, but this needs to be recognized by the 
citizens. In state-building the citizens recognition is not necessary and may only stand in the 	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way of rapid development of the state. Thus, nation-building is a more time-consuming 
process where the preliminary requisites are just as important as the establishment of a state 
apparatus. Although time-consuming, nation-building may arguably be more stable over time 
than state-building, because after having agreed on and created a national identity it is 
difficult to tear down that identity. When doing state-building, there is merely a state 
apparatus built by the use of coercion, which is much more unstable. 
 As a final remark on nation-building one can discuss the terms national identity, and 
territoriality of a nation-state: “Is it reasonable, for instance, to try to create an Afghan or 
Pakistani Nation-State – or should the focus of attention rather be a Pashto Nation-state 
instead, because ‘Afghans’ and ‘Pakistanis’ do not exist at all, while Pashtos [sic] do?”64 The 
territoriality of a state does not necessarily correlate with different groups within the state, 
thus it is a plausible solution to change the borders of a state in order to create the national 
identity with less effort and conflict. This will not be discussed in depth within this thesis, but 
it is an aspect that can influence the process of nation-building both regarding the level of 
conflict and the efficiency of the process. 
 A third element in my typology is society-building, which is more difficult to define. 
In general civil society development is viewed to “… involve support for the associational 
sphere of interest groups which stand between the private sphere of the family and market 
economy and the public sphere of the state.”65 In other words, civil society development is 
the sphere of society that the state is not involved in, where non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) are often used as the voice of the civic community, as well as act as a link between 
the civic community and the state.66 NGOs are in the case of being the link between the civic 
community and the state also viewed as “…part of the process of democratization.”67  
 The most difficult part of defining society-building is to define the civil society. The 
definition of civil society is highly disputed, whereas no efforts to define it have resulted in 
an agreement on an academic understanding of the term. At the same time, efforts have been 
made to define civil society, and it has also been done in the context of Afghanistan:  
Civil society refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared 
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct 
from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries 	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between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. 
Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered 
charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, 
women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, 
trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, 
coalitions and advocacy groups. … In addition there are two aspects of life 
which are arguably part of civil society in Afghanistan … [namely] cultural 
activities … [and] individual activities.68 
Civil society is complex, but the in general it is defined as the parts of social life that are not 
directly connected to the state.  
 The ways of building or developing civic society can be narrowed down to two 
aspects. Firstly, individual development that refers to individual citizens’ effort to build or 
develop civil society. Strong individuals that have a special cause of interest they wish to 
develop run these efforts. These interests may be shared with others, creating groups of 
individuals that collaborate in order to reach their goal. These individuals can work by 
themselves or in groups, funded by local support or by foreign governments or organisations. 
An important factor is that these individuals lack experience and the infrastructure of an 
organisation. Because of this their efforts are likely to have a low degree of efficiency as well 
as a short reach. The second aspect of society-building, on the other hand, revolves around 
NGOs, which have the necessary experience and infrastructure that widens the reach of the 
society-building efforts, as well as the efficiency of the work. The NGOs may do the same 
work as individuals, but because of the infrastructure of the organisations they may focus 
more on complex processes such as democratization. NGOs have the necessary experience to 
work with these more complex issues than committed individuals, thereby their work is able 
to have a wider reach, but it may lack the commitment that individual citizens have because 
the individuals are far more connected to the civic society being built or developed. In that 
sense, these two ways of performing society-building complements each other; where the 
first way possesses a high degree of commitment, the second possesses the necessary 
experience to complete the work. 
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1.6 Hypothesis and methodology 
This thesis will use a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, with the case study 
of Afghanistan (2007-2012). The qualitative analysis consists of two essential parts: The first 
is a review of American foreign policy traditions and the specific foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan during 2007-2012. The second is an analysis of the relationship between foreign 
policy, foreign aid, the three typologies, and partly self-interest. The quantitative analysis 
consists of a review of the U.S. foreign aid contributions to Afghanistan during the time 
period 2007-2012. The quantitative analysis will serve as a backdrop for the discussion of 
foreign policy and foreign aid, aiming to give a deeper understanding of American foreign 
relations. 
 The case study of Afghanistan (2007-2012) is chosen because it is a modern case of 
foreign relations, as well as being one of the most prioritized countries for U.S. foreign aid 
the past decade. It is also one of the world’s least developed countries, which makes it an 
interesting area of study as the opportunities and challenges in developing it towards a 
modern state are many. 
 The three typologies that have been presented in section 1.6 will serve as analytical 
tools when analysing the aid given from the U.S. to Afghanistan during the time period 2007-
2012 by trying to identify what typology is best represented by the aid spending of the U.S. 
government. The acquired dataset consists of complete annual reports for the OECD for 
2007-2012, divided by funding agency, what projects have received money, and how much 
money the different projects have received. These will be further explained in the next 
chapter. The analysis of the data will test the following hypotheses: 
 
• Hypothesis 1 (H1) – The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-
2012), was related to state-building. 
• Hypothesis 2 (H2) – The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-
2012) was related to nation-building. 
• Hypothesis 3 (H3) – The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-
2012) was related to society-building. 
• Hypothesis 4 (H4) – The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-
2012) was related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. 
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1.7 American foreign policy traditions 
Brendon O’Connor, in his article “American foreign policy traditions: A literature review”, 
discusses the term political tradition as well as what American foreign policy traditions 
exists. O’Connor’s article is a literature review of the subject and is a credible source for a 
discussion on American foreign policy traditions. It will be used in order to establish what 
different traditions have been established and how they are used today. This is a preparation 
for a later discussion in chapter three on the relationship between the American aid efforts in 
Afghanistan (2007-2012), the three typologies state-, nation-, and society-building, and the 
American policy towards Afghanistan 2007-2012. 
 The study of political traditions is according to O’Connor “… an examination of how 
the past informs the present.”69 Traditions may vanish after becoming outdated, but old 
traditions may still be influential for centuries.70 These traditions may compete or intersect, 
and are often “… the bridge between intellectuals and political practitioners.”71 O’Connor 
observes that American people are fond of traditions and, with reference to Walter Russell 
Mead, he writes:  
’This respect for national tradition is one of our stronger and most valuable 
traits. It is based on two different elements: and admiration for founding 
principles based on the degree to which the enlightened ideas of the 
Revolutionary era still commend themselves to the American mind, and a 
sober historical recognition that under the guidance of the American Republic 
has enjoyed far happier political and material existence any other 
commonwealth of comparable size in the history of the world’.72 
In other words, the American relationship to traditions is very strong and rooted in the 
foundation of the U.S. as well as the view of the USA being the most prosperous 
commonwealth ever having existed. O’Connor further stresses the importance of “… solid 
evidence of strong resonance and an influence over time … [and] that there is a hierarchy of 
traditions; not every tradition can command the same level of influence.”73 This adds to the 
aspect of the use of a tradition for a significant amount of time, as well as the aspect of the 
difference in relevance of the traditions. 
 Walter McDougal divides American foreign policy into two periods, the Old 
Testament and the New Testament:  	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The Old Testament approach sees America as the promised land where 
republican liberty can be preserved if America knows its limitations and keeps 
the rest of the world out of its affairs. In opposition, the ‘New Testament 
traditions define America as Crusader State called to bring the salvation to a 
world ravaged by revolution and war.’74 
Anatol Levien claims that because of “…messianic and exceptionalist beliefs, America is 
more than a country – it is an ideology.”75 In my opinion it is important to understand 
American Exceptionalism when reviewing foreign policy because it arguably is the source of 
what McDougal calls the “Crusader State,” and also Levien’s notion of the American 
ideology. The American governmental system is unique, and has in my opinion become the 
source of American expansionism in the sense that spreading freedom and democracy are of 
the most vital aspects of American foreign policy. As noted earlier, when referring to 
Williams and the U.S. commitment to Cuba in the 1950s, the whole point of the commitment 
was to rebuild Cuba in the image of America. This underlines the point that American 
Exceptionalism and foreign policy is tightly connected because foreign policy was based on 
spreading American ideals on the assumption that the American system was essential in order 
for Cuba to become a state with the same level of development as the United States. 
 Walter Russell Mead “… suggests that the history of American foreign policy is 
better understood with reference to four traditions: Hamiltonianism, Jeffersonianism, 
Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism.”76 These four traditions are all central themes in Mead’s 
book Special Providence: American foreign policy and how it changed the world, and have 
also been explained in other articles written by Mead, such as “American Grand Strategy in a 
World at Risk”. Mead describes the background of the four traditions, which all are 
connected to what he calls a British Legacy.77 The elements inherited by the British are 
specifically: 
[A] monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the 
chief theaters of the world … Second is sea and air power, which enables the 
United States to exert force in all areas where its interests may be threatened 
… The third element of U.S. grand strategy is its objective of transforming 
international politics. Washington is not always clear on what it is trying to do 
in this regard, but in general it wants the world to be more democratic than it 
is, since this would make America feel safer.78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 5. 
75 "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 6. 
76 "American Foreign Policy Traditions," 9. 
77 Walter Russell Mead, "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," Orbis 49, no. 4 (2005): 590. 
78 "American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk," 590-91. 
	  	  24	  
Mead also observes a strategic hierarchy, meaning that the United States has a priority of 
which regions are most important for the foreign policy. These regions are Europe, East Asia 
and the Middle East.79 Since 9/11, Mead observes a shift in priority for these regions, where 
it previously was Europe, East Asia, Middle East it is now Middle East, East Asia, and 
Europe. Another thing Mead observes is how the intensity of U.S. foreign policy has changed 
after 9/11, especially in the willingness of the citizens in relation to engage in actions on 
foreign territories.80  
 The final change in American foreign policy that Mead observes is in the political 
foundation, where he introduces the four traditions. He writes: “[all] four schools are deeply 
rooted in the American experience … The four schools are not blood types, with every 
individual typed by one and only one label.”81 The first tradition is the Hamiltonian school, 
which is economically driven. According to Mead it “… sees the task of the American 
government as promoting the health of American enterprise at home and abroad.”82 Mead 
further explains that there is a strong relation between the government and big business for 
Hamiltonians in order to achieve stability at home and to be able to effectively act abroad, 
which also implies a wish for a globalized economy.  
 The second tradition is the Wilsonian school, which believes that “… the United 
States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American 
democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international 
community that accepts the rule of law.”83 Furthermore, Mead claims that this position stems 
from a belief that the spreading of American values is vital in order to hold American 
interests. 
 The third tradition is the Jeffersonian school, which focuses more on protecting 
American values in the domestic territory rather than spreading democracy abroad, meaning 
that it has a focus on low cost and low level of danger in order to protect American values.84 
 The fourth and final tradition is the Jacksonian school, where the “… most important 
goal of the U.S. government in both foreign and domestic policy should be the physical 
security and the economic well-being of the American people.”85 Mead further explains that 
this should be achieved by not provoking foreign states. But, if there are wars where the 	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United States has interests it should participate, in which the only alternative is to win. In 
relation to the evolvement of these traditions Mead writes: 
While interest groups, regions, and to some degree the economic interests that 
each school reflects have remained more or less constant through the 
generations, the policy proposals and priorities of the four schools have 
developed over time in response to historical, social, and economic changes, 
both within the Unites States and beyond its borders.86 
This means that the situation today (post-9/11) has laid the foundation for the Jacksonian 
tradition. Mead claims that the strategic actions made by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were correct, but the tactics of the actions were not necessarily successful.87 This also meant 
a change in how the U.S. dealt with Europe as they no longer saw it necessary to confer with 
the European state leaders before acting, which also applies for the international 
organisations, partly also because the international organisations can be viewed as 
dysfunctional.88 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 The American foreign policy tradition has been criticized for being “… naïve and 
unsophisticated.”89 Referring to Massachusetts’ congressman Fisher Ames, O’Connor claims 
that this is a misunderstanding because, at that time, the new and inventive system of 
government in the older European kingdoms did not understand the differences between the 
consistencies of a republic.90 U.S. foreign policy is characterized by having competing 
policies, while the European standard is to have a unified policy. When considering foreign 
policy today this is still the case; the American foreign policy has a possibility to change with 
the election of a new president, while in i.e. Norway the main decisions on foreign policy is 
not decided by the government, but by the parliament. Norwegian foreign policy has a mantra 
to be consistent and consensual, and the political parties that are forming the government 
normally cannot alter this in any large degree.91 In the U.S. the elected government, run by 
the president, holds the foreign policy decisions.  
 Moving between multiple foreign policies is related to American self-interests and the 
realpolitik that American foreign policy executes. Foreign policy interests change with the 	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changing regional and national situations abroad. American foreign policy is dependent on 
being able to float different policies over time, as there is a belief in the connection between 
American domestic affairs and foreign events. Thus, the president’s ability to alter foreign 
policy according to situations abroad is vital for American interests. American self-interest is 
rooted in pragmatism and ideology. The ideology is deeply rooted in democracy and 
freedom, and these aspects have been important factors when promoting American values 
abroad. Realpolitik has become the instrument for promoting these values, thus pragmatic 
realism is the utmost used tactic in foreign relations. The use of realpolitik has a changing 
pattern in connection with the situation abroad and will continue to evolve according to 
future changes. 
 The Presidents’ foreign policy decisions are also connected to competing American 
foreign policy traditions. Different presidents have supported their foreign policy on the four 
different policy traditions described by Mead (section 1.8). There is a relationship between a 
president’s view of the relevant foreign relations and the foreign policy tradition he seems to 
follow. Because the four traditions are so diverse, it is possible for different presidents to hold 
the view of one of them within their presidency, while for the next elected president foreign 
relations may change, and thereby the grounds for his foreign policy will change which will 
divert him to another foreign policy tradition. 
 The state-building strategies described in section 1.6 are also connected to the 
competing foreign policies of a president and his administration. They are in essence a 
consequence of the realpolitik considerations the administration have to take, which are 
dictated according to the foreign policy tradition the president’s administration falls under. 
Whether the focus is on doing the job at home (Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism) or abroad 
(Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism), if it is economically driven (Hamiltonianism and 
Jacksonianism) or ideologically driven (Wilsonianism and Jeffersonianism), the foreign 
policy tradition that dictates the president’s administration will influence the priority of state-
building strategies. A foreign focus, i.e. Wilsonianism, will focus on spreading freedom and 
democracy on order to create peaceful societies. In long-term contexts nation-building will 
prove the best state-building strategy as it builds a strong and secure state, but it is costly and 
thereby a Jeffersonian administration will not see it possible to do so as it is both working 
abroad as well as depriving the domestic American economy of large funds. Overall, the 
president and his administration work as a buckle on a strap that holds it all together.  
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2 An analysis of U. S. Foreign aid to 
 Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 
 
 
2.1 Introduction to the quantitative data 
The U.S. effort to contribute with developmental aid to Afghanistan was immense, which is 
evident through the total amount of aid being given for the period 2007-2012. During that 
time the U.S. gave more than $15 billion to Afghanistan.92 USAID were given the task to 
create reports for OECD regarding ODA, whereby they created per annum data sheets which 
they combined into a publicly available document, accessible at their website.93 This 
document contains ODA given to all nations, for the years 2007-2012, making it is an 
extensive document containing a large amount of data. Because this thesis concerns aid to 
Afghanistan alone, I selected projects that were only implemented in Afghanistan, 687 
projects titles in all. Some of these projects were funded only for one year, others were 
funded for several years, and some were funded per annum for the entire researched period. 
For this thesis I have divided the projects into three main groups representing the typologies 
introduced in the theoretical framework: State-building, nation-building and society-building. 
This requires a large amount of research, as it is necessary investigate out what purposes of 
the different projects had. At the same time, there are several project titles in the data that are 
related to one another, thereby it is possible to generalize somewhat when dividing the 
projects into the three typologies. One also has to keep in mind that the scope of a master 
thesis has to be somewhat narrow in order to perform a complete analysis. Therefore, there 
are some developmental aid projects that cannot be reviewed in depth within this specific 
amount of work, but the general focus of the different project groups will be taken into 
account.  
 
2.2 Dividing the data according to the typologies 
The quantitative data consists of four variables: The recipient country, project title, extending 
agency name, and the per annum contribution to the projects (spread out over the years 2007-	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2012).94 The variables are classified differently in which the recipient country variable, the 
project title variable, and the extending agency name variable are on the nominal scale, hence 
being qualitative variables. The per annum contribution on the other hand, is a quantitative 
variable on the ratio scale. This means that the only variable that can be measured 
quantitatively is the per annum contribution variable. 
 The data are divided according to the three typologies presented in the introduction, 
state-building, nation-building and society-building. In order to establish the purpose of the 
projects it is necessary to research the different project titles. The result of this is that some 
projects are difficult or impossible to divide into one of the three typologies, creating two 
more categories: Those projects impossible to divide into any of the typologies, and 
economic projects that are not related to nation-building. 
 
State-building projects 
In accordance with the definition of state-building, the identification of projects that fall 
under this typology are projects aiming to build a minimum of state apparatus, which is able 
to have a scope and strength. Projects that enable the state apparatus to reach out to 
institutions and to create and enforce laws are those related to state-building. When reviewing 
the dataset there are several projects related to state-building, especially those related to 
enforcement of laws and the ability to monopolize force.95 Some examples of the ability to 
enforce laws are the training of Afghan personnel to cope with police work, anti-narcotics 
programs and training, and border enforcement. Regarding the ability to monopolize force, 
there are mainly projects which focus on weapon control, meaning the police forces would 
not have to cope with civilians having guns, making them the major source of force in 
Afghanistan. There are also some projects related to building the state apparatus and enabling 
the executive legislation to do their work, hence the scope of the state.  
 
Nation-building projects 
Nation-building focuses on building a national society and economy with emphasis on tying 
together all parts of the country. This means that within the dataset the projects related to 
rebuilding or building infrastructure, for such purposes as transportation and communication 
as well as necessary basic needs (i.e. water and sanitation), are related to the nation-building 
typology. The state-apparatus may overlap with state-building, but in the case of comparing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 "U.S. Oda Disbursements by Recipient Country and U.S. Agency." 
95 See appendix for a list of all the projects that are classified as state-building.  
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nation-building with state-building, nation-building has a larger focus on the state being 
recognized by the citizens and for the citizens to collaborate on the creation of a national 
identity. Thus, projects that i.e. are meant to do conflict mitigation are also nation-building 
projects. 
 The projects related to nation-building may be classified as basic economy formation, 
conflict mitigation, infrastructural development, and media formation. Infrastructure is, as 
previously stated, a predisposition in order to be able to create a national identity, whereby 
basic needs are necessary to be covered in order to be able to discuss a national identity 
(water and food must come first). Also, transportation and communication is important 
predispositions that enable tribal communities to communicate where they have not been able 
to before. Conflict mitigation is a vital part of getting tribal communities to sort out their 
differences, creating the necessary foundation for a national identity. The media is a source of 
communication and the creation of awareness in Afghanistan, making it intertwine with 
communication as an infrastructure because the media communicates with the Afghan 
citizens. It is important to stress that the projects in the data that are related to media are 
meant to help build independent media. As I am not able to measure if the media actually is 
independent or not, the purpose of the projects are used as argumentation for dividing the 
media-related projects among the typologies. 
 
Society-building projects 
Society-building involves individuals or groups that are building a pluralistic society based 
on citizenship in the current western model, often by the use of NGOs, where the state is not 
involved in the issues being dealt with. This implies that the projects involving support for 
NGOs, related to the civil society rather than building of the state apparatus, are the projects 
related to society-building. Projects involving infrastructure (roads, communication, etc.) will 
usually include the state in some way, as the government must maintain the infrastructure, be 
it local or state level. The main project groups related to society-building are thus cultural 
projects, projects that support certain groups of society (such as women and victims of 
violence), reintegration done by private organisations, humanitarian aid, privately funded 
healthcare projects, and similar projects. Within the dataset there are particularly two general 
project titles (they both have a lot of subtitles) aimed at the civil society: Title II Food Aid, 
funded by USAID, and National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded by the U.S. 
Department of State. Title II Food aid is a food program (humanitarian help), while NED is a 
private organisation that works for spreading democracy. Although NED is funded through 
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the Department of State, it acts as a private actor in Afghanistan, which makes the work 
related to society-building. 
 
Economic projects not related to nation-building 
Some of the economic projects in the dataset are not related to nation-building, and because 
of the purpose of the projects, they are difficult to ascribe to any of the three typologies. 
Because of this they will be left out of this analysis to enable a conclusion that is not 
conflicted by projects that may have been wrongly ascribed to any of the typologies. 
 
Projects that are impossible to divide into typologies 
Finally, there are some projects that are difficult to ascribe to any of the three typologies 
because there is lack of descriptions of the purpose of the projects. After meticulous research 
it is not possible to find any answer to what the purpose of these projects are, and thereby 
they must be left out of the analysis as they may be a source of error. Many of these projects 
are titled “administration and oversight” and the extending agency for these projects was 
USAID. After several attempts to find the purpose of these projects without results, they are 
ascribed as costs for USAID’s administration, and keeping an oversight on the many projects 
they have going on in Afghanistan. Such money, not going to the Afghan society or state, 
does not belong in this research as it does not say anything about the purpose of American 
developmental aid, and thereby will be left out.  
 
2.3 Reliability and validity 
 It is important to use reliable and valid data when performing quantitative analysis in 
order for the results of the analysis to be plausible and relevant for other researchers. The data 
being used are official data sheets delivered for official purposes from the U.S. government, 
via USAID, to the DAC, where they are to be reviewed. Therefore he data must be said to be 
highly trustworthy, but it is also important to keep in mind that the data being used are 
downloaded as a standard Microsoft Excel document where errors may occur. This is 
difficult to test or prove, revealing a possible source of error in the analysis. On the other 
hand, considering the source of the data, the reliability of the data is arguably very good 
because it is used to report to OECD. 
 The validity of the use of the data is another matter entirely, and it is more difficult to 
determine with such certainty as with the reliability of the data. In this thesis the data is used 
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to try to identify which of the three typologies the U.S. government are related to when 
donating development aid for Afghanistan (2007-2012). It is also a goal to identify what the 
self-interest was for the American government when contributing with development aid to 
Afghanistan. I will approach this by analysing the relation between the different aid projects 
and the money being spent. It is possible to assume that there is a relation between the 
amount of projects, the amount of money contributed to each project, and thereby to each 
typology after having distributed the projects per typology. What may be an issue is the 
distribution of projects according to the typologies, because there is a large amount of data 
needing to be researched and analysed in order to divide the projects into three categories. 
This may involve traces of subjective justification, as several project descriptions may be 
related to several of the typologies, so in order to present results decisions must be made to 
make the data applicable for the analysis. Although this may be a source of error, or at least 
subjective opinion, it is vital to stress that this research and analysis is done as objectively as 
possible. The inner logic of this research is sound and will provide a conclusion that is viable 
and able to withstand criticism against the inner logic, but there is a possibility that the 
research may not be agreeable for academics with different views and different approaches to 
the subject. 
 Another potential source of error is that the research uses the intended purpose of the 
different projects in order to distribute them among the typologies. Because it is difficult to 
test the actual impact of the projects, it is also difficult to use to use them in another way than 
using the intended purpose. The problem with this is that i.e. the intended building of an 
independent media may actually not be independent. The purpose of the research is not to 
measure if the projects are successful, but rather to analyse the purpose of American 
developmental aid and to identify which of the three typologies that the American 
government relates to, thus the success of the aid projects is an entirely different research 
project. 
 
2.4 The use of the data 
The data is firstly presented in total, then by typology, and finally they will be compared 
across typologies. The presentation of the numbers in total includes a distribution of aid in 
total for 2007-2012, as well as for the extending agencies. It also introduces the distribution 
per typology. The presentation by typology includes a presentation of the allocated aid for 
each typology, the number of projects, the median distribution per project and the distribution 
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per agency for the typology being analysed. The comparison across the typologies uses the 
previously presented data in order to compare them and analyse the differences. 
 
2.5 Total distributions 
 
2.5.1 Total distribution of U.S. aid to Afghanistan (2007-2012) 
The amount of U.S. Dollars spent in Afghanistan increased significantly from 2007 to 2009, 
where the amount of aid was quite stable until 2012, where it dropped again. From 2007 to 
2009 the amount of aid increased by 96,79 per cent, in other words it came very close to  
being doubled in two years. What can then be discussed is why this happened, and where the 
extra funding went. What immediately comes to mind is that the situation in Afghanistan may 
have changed during those years in the sense that the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan 
increased. Another point may be that the U.S. government struggled to have an impact on the 
Afghan society when trying to help, and that the huge increase in aid was an aggressive 
strategy to fulfil the goals that the U.S. government had set for itself. In that sense, the U.S. 
government might have seen no other option than to ‘invest’ a lot more money in 
Afghanistan in order to make an impact, or fulfil their goals. The dip in 2012 can also suggest 
that the possible aggressive strategy did not work, thereby there being no point in continuing 
the vast disbursement of U.S. aid in Afghanistan. Another factor can be that the U.S. 
government saw its commitment in Afghanistan as decreasing, especially with regard to the 
withdrawal of military personnel, thereby resulting in a lack of necessity to spend such a vast 
amount of money in Afghanistan. What needs to be noted is that the decrease in given aid 
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from 2011 to 2012 was not as large as the increase from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, it may be 
that expensive project(s) had been finished, or in effect scaled down with regard to funding. 
There are traces of this pattern in the data when comparing some of the top ten projects in 
2011 and 2012. For example, the second highest funded project in 2011, “Conflict 
Mitigation,” decreased in funding by more than $ 140 million from 2011 to 2012. “Transport 
Services” had a decrease of more than $ 77 million from 2011 to 2012. There are also similar 
examples where there was a large decrease in funding from 2011 to 2012 that are outside of 
the ‘top ten’ tables. At the same time, there is a need to point out that “Public Sector 
Executive Function” increased from 2011 to 2012 by more than $273 million, which covers 
the decrease of the two projects mentioned above. In other words, the decrease of funding for 
some projects was balanced by the increase of funding for other projects, perhaps indicating 
an important point; the U.S. government must also balance their foreign aid budget, thereby 
needing to take funding for one project in order to fund another. In other words, it is a 
question of priorities for the U.S. government. 
 
2.5.2 Distribution per agency  
The distribution by extending agency name consists of the allocated aid per year, for the 
different agencies, sorted by the ascending total amount of aid given for 2007-2012 (Table 1), 
before distributing the projects per typology (leaving some projects uncategorized), meaning 
that these numbers consist of the total allocated aid for Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012. 
 
	  
Table	  1 
U.S. aid to Aghanistan by extending agency name, per allocated year 2007-2012 (million USD)
Extending Agency Name
Allocated aid per year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 2007-2012 per agency
U.S. Agency for International 
Developmentntnt 921,94122 1181,32349 1789,06965 1993,36039 2185,96331 1952,15312
10023,81118
Department of State 115,79749 210,43811 336,62284 459,21099 333,30265 507,88047 1963,25255
Department of the Army 205,38742 485,30112 548,35386 316,05324 0 0 1555,09564
Department of Defense 240,103 204,123 276,16357 0 521,42996 280,43502 1522,25455
Department of Agriculture 13,06101 20,86099 18,88471 116,97603 26,84853 23,47244 220,10371
Department of Helath and Human Services 16,25314 7,34591 6,26075 3,1663 1,24984 0,32168 34,59762
Department of the Treasury 0,36579 0,06204 0,49119 2,64274 3,4367 2,06392 9,06238
Department of Transportation 0 0 0 0 1,41518 6,6977 8,11288
Department of Justice 0 0,26985 3,3452 0,59864 0,30799 0,04916 4,57084
Trade and Development Agency 1,19528 1,09646 0,72261 0,25 0,156 0 3,42035
Department of Labor 0 0,65 0 1,1 0 0 1,75
Department of Commerce 0 0 0 0 0,88733 0 0,88733
Department of Energy 0,17932 0,1 0,00208 0,01879 0 0 0,30019
Department of Homeland Security 0 0,01132 0 0 0 0,07395 0,08527
Total 1514,28367 2111,58229 2979,91646 2893,37712 3074,99749 2773,14746 15347,30449
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There are some interesting aspects to be discussed regarding Table 1. First of all, and not 
surprisingly considering it is the Agency for International Development, USAID was the 
agency that distributed most American aid during the years researched. They distributed more 
than 65,31 per cent of the allocated aid during 2007-2012, while the agency that distributed 
second to most aid distributed 12,79 per cent. The Department of State, the Department of the 
Army, and the Department of Defence all contributed with at least $ 1 500 million, while the 
rest of the extending agencies contributed with significantly less aid. 
 Because USAID is the American government’s agency for international development 
they contribute with aid for different societal sectors, such as infrastructure, health, 
education, economic development, political development, etc. The consequence is that when 
analysing American foreign aid, most allocated aid was distributed by USAID, but that does 
not mean that the other agencies were of less importance. What is more interesting is to 
uncover what specific projects received most money from the U.S. Because the goal is to 
reveal which of the three typologies the U.S. government prioritized and whether or not these 
priorities changed during the researched period, the projects are the main selection for the 
analysis of U.S. aid given to Afghanistan. The reason being that the projects’ purposes enable 
the identification of which typology the U.S. government was related to. The agencies were 
funding or distributing the money for the projects and are under no circumstances 
insignificant, but in this study they are less significant than the projects. With that being said, 
the agencies are discussed, but only as part of the discussion about the projects. The reason 
for presenting the distribution by extending agency is to show how the different agencies 
contributed to American ODA in Afghanistan, but also because it is the most orderly way of 
presenting the grand totals of each year and the shift in how much aid was given during the 
researched years. 
  
2.5.3 Distribution per typology 
The distribution per typology (Table 2) is a result of carefully analysing the purpose of the 
projects in relation to the definition of each typology, thereby dividing them into four 
categories, one for each of the typology and one for the projects that are impossible to divide 
between the typologies. 
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Table	  2	  	  
The distribution per typology immediately reveals some interesting observations, whereby 
the first is the difference in total allocated aid when comparing it to the distribution per 
agency. The difference between the total of two distributions is the amount of aid spent on 
the projects that are difficult or impossible to classify according to the definition of the 
typologies. As discussed earlier, this is a source of error because a large amount of money is 
not taken into consideration when analysing the numbers. At the same time, it would be a 
greater source of error if it was included, because it would possibly create a wrong 
illustration of the amount of aid allocated for each of the typologies. The second observation 
that reveals itself when looking at Table 2 is the difference in aid given per typology. Nation-
building projects clearly received the most aid with as much as 46 % of the total amount of 
aid being given for the typologies. State-building projects received 33 % of the total amount 
of aid, while society-building projects received 22 % of the total amount of aid. 
 
Table	  3	  
This presentation of the numbers implies that the U.S. government in the largest degree were 
contributing to nation-building, and in the least degree contributed to society-building when 
contributing with developmental aid to Afghanistan. It also implies that the U.S. 
government’s aid contribution was related to more than only one of the typologies, thereby 
also implying that the answer to the research question is complex. 
 There are also interesting initial observations when reviewing the allocation of aid for 
the typologies per annum: 	  
 
 
 
Total amount of allocated aid (million USD)
Period of time State-building Nation-building Society-building Total 
2007-2012 4548,16311 6392,26371 3034,51859 13974,94541
Percentage of Table 2
Period of time State-building Nation-building Society-building Total 
2007-2012 33 % 46 % 22 % 100 %
	  	  36	  
 
Except from 2010, society-building was the least prioritised when it comes to aid spending 
for 2007-2012. The spending on society-building projects had a fairly even upward trend 
until 2011 where it fell considerably to 63 % of what was spent in 2011. This is also the case 
for nation-building projects, which in 2012 received only 53 % of what was donate for 
nation-building projects in 2011. State-building, on the other hand, increased with 60 % from 
2011 to 2012, meaning that there seems to have been a shift in priority to what the U.S. 
government related to of the three typologies. The fall for nation-building also seems to have 
been a trend from 2010 to 2012. On average, it is observable that nation-building evenly was 
the highest prioritised of the three typologies, except for 2012. 
 The allocated aid per typology is interesting and perhaps the most significant way to 
measure the priority of each of the typologies, but analysing the amount of projects per 
typology can also reveal interesting observations. 
 
 
Graph	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This distribution is quite different from the allocated aid. By far, the largest amount of 
projects was related to society-building. As much as 71 % of the projects were related to 
society-building, while 21 % of the projects were related to nation-building, and only 9 % of 
the projects were related to state-building. Hence, all the typologies were prioritized 
differently with regard to the amount of projects per typology. This means that each society-
building project received less money per project than nation-building and state-building 
projects. The reason for this is that society-building is aimed at the civil society and smaller 
societal groups, which means that there is a need for more projects than for nation-building or 
state-building. Society-building projects are of smaller scale, and each project costs less to 
fund, which means that there are more projects that can be funded. The consequence is that 
the average amount of money spent per project is significantly lower than for nation-building 
and state-building. 
  
	  	    
Chart	  1 
Average money spent on each project (million USD)
State-building Nation-building Society-building
Funding 89 53 7
Table	  4 
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As shown in Table 4, the average money spent on society-building projects was $ 7 million, 
which is only 8 % of what was averagely spent per state-building project. When analysing the 
average spending per project the priority of the typologies yet again seem to differ. The 
average spending on state-building projects was significantly larger than both nation-building 
and society-building projects. Furthermore, nation-building projects were on average 
significantly larger than society-building projects. The average spending per project for the 
typologies supports the argument that society-building projects are smaller in size, making it 
possible to fund more projects for less money in total than for nation-building and state-
building. The problem with using the average spending as a tool for the analysis is that it 
does not control for extreme observations and for that reason it is also interesting to look at 
the median amount of money spent per project for the three typologies. 
 
 
The median amount of money spent per project is quite different from the average money 
spent per project, as depicted in Table 5. The most obvious difference is that state-building 
projects’ median spending was significantly lower than expected, considering the large 
average spending. The difference between the median spending on state-building and society-
building is as low as about 3:4, whereas the median for state-building was highest. This 
emphasises the importance of controlling for extreme observations and implies that there 
were a few state-building projects that received far more money than the average project. The 
relation between the average and the median spending per state-building project is as large as 
2:601. This is also true for society-building, but the difference between the median and 
average spending per project is significantly lower (2:67) than for the case of state-building. 
When it comes to nation-building, the median spending per project is also significantly lower 
than the average spending per project, but the relation between the average and median 
spending is about 1:10. This implies that there are some nation-building projects receiving 
much more funding than the average project. Because the nation-building projects received 
most total funding, and because of the ratio between the median and the average spending on 
Median money spent on each project (million USD)
State-building Nation-building Society-building
Funding 0,29682 5,35236 0,21969
Table	  5 
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nation-building projects, it also implies that the nation-building projects on average were 
larger than both state-building and nation-building projects. 
 
2.6 The relation between the extending agencies and aid 
recipients by category 
By looking at the amount of projects and aid given to each of the typologies in relation to the 
different agencies and the typologies, it is possible to go deeper into the discussion about 
which of the typologies the U.S. government related to when contributing with aid to 
Afghanistan. 
 
2.6.1 State-building 
 
 
Table	  6	  	  
As seen in Table 6 above, there are large variations in how much money the different 
extending agencies spent on state-building, and in how much average or median money was 
spent per project as well. First of all there, are four agencies that did not contributed to any of 
the state-building projects. Department of Labor and Department of commerce are 
preoccupied with economic cases and thereby it is natural that they did not contributed to 
Total, median and average aid from agency for state-building (million USD)
Extending agency Total Median Average
U.S. Agency for International Development 1771,46155 3,083335 0,43853
Department of State 1640,10638 3,33891 126,1620292
Department of Defense 1071,25452 175,64896 214,252572
Department of the Army 59,36062 29,68031 29,68031
Department of Justice 4,57084 0,04458 0,2856775
Department of the Treasury 1,31559 0,2954 0,43853
Department of Homeland Security 0,08527 0,01956 0,0213175
Department of Agriculture 0,00834 0,00834 0,00834
Department of Commerce 0 0 0
Department of Health and Human Services 0 0 0
Department of Labor 0 0 0
Department of Transportation 0 0 0
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state-building projects. Department of Transportation only contributed with one project 
during the time-period examined, which was a nation-building project as transportation is 
infrastructure.96 Department of Health and Human Services are naturally related to society-
building projects because they do work with health and human services, and not building a 
state apparatus and enabling them to attain a monopoly on force. These four extending 
agencies will therefore not be discussed further in relation to state-building projects. 
 There are several observations to point out for the distribution presented in Table 6. 
Firstly, both USAID and Department of State each contributed with about one third of the 
total amount of state-building aid, while the Department of Defense contributed with about 
one quarter of the total amount of aid for state-building. Thus, these three extending agencies 
by far had the largest impact on how the American effort to do state-building work in 
Afghanistan was shaped. Because many of the state-building projects were related to the 
training of Afghan personnel, with the purpose to give them the ability to enforce laws, it is 
not surprising that the Department of Defense in a large extent was involved with state-
building efforts. The state-building projects related to the building of a state apparatus is not 
surprisingly involving the Department of State is, but they are also connected to the ability to 
enforce laws. USAID is the government organisation for developmental aid and is the agency 
that contributed the most in total, but also per typology.  
 Although the total sums may give answers to which extending agency was most 
involved, it is not an accurate measurement regarding the involvement and dedication to each 
state-building project. When analysing Table 6 one can immediately observe that USAID had 
a rather low average spending per state-building project, while the median spending was 
somewhat bigger. At slightly more than $ 3 million median spending per project, USAID and 
the Department of State seem to have been equally committed to the state-building projects. 
The Department of Defense, on the other hand, must have been said to be committed in a 
greater extend, with a median contribution of more than $ 175 million per state-building 
project, making it the agency with the highest median contribution. The Department of the 
Army’s total contribution was just above $ 59 million, while the median contribution was 
almost $ 30 million per state-building project. This implies that the Department of the Army 
did not contribute with aid for many state-building projects, but it also implies that when it 
did contribute it was with a large commitment. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 A complete listing of the projects, divided per typology, can be found in the appendix. 
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2.6.2 Nation-building 
 
Nation-building projects also lacked support from some of the extending agencies. 
Department of Commerce is mostly related to economy, and while some of the economic 
projects were related to nation-building that was not the case for the Department of 
Commerce. Department of Health and Human Services, as previously stated, do humanitarian 
work and their aid projects will fall under the society-building category. Department of 
Homeland Security contributes with aid for projects that are related to security and law 
enforcement, hence they are not related to nation-building, as is also the case for the 
Department of Justice. 
 USAID was the agency that contributed with most aid for nation-building projects, 72 
% of the total amount for nation-building aid. The Department of the Army was second to 
largest, while the Department of Defense was third to largest on the descending list with 21 
% and 5 % of the total amount of aid for nation-building. Department of Defense contributed 
with the most aid per project according to the median distribution, meaning they were more 
economically committed to each project than USAID. USAID on the other hand, contributed 
second to most according to the median distribution also implying a commitment to the 
nation-building projects they supported. 
Total, median and average aid from agency for nation-building (million USD)
Extending agency Total Median Average
U.S. Agency for International Development 4613,72158 12,37651 83,88584691
Department of the Army 1330,62396 7,97463 88,708264
Department of Defense 333,21014 33,94713 7,401323077
Department of Agriculture 96,2172 1,84943 7,401323077
Department of Transportation 8,11288 8,11288 8,11288
Department of the Treasury 7,74679 0,31488 0,455693529
Department of Labor 1,75 0,6 0,583333333
Department of State 0,88116 0,046945 0,088116
Department of Commerce 0 0 0
Department of Health and Human Services 0 0 0
Department of Homeland Security 0 0 0
Department of Justice 0 0 0
Table	  7 
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 When comparing median and average distribution of aid per project, especially for 
USAID and the Department of the Army, it is noticeable that there are a few extreme 
observations that received more aid than the average project. This indicates that some of the 
nation-building projects were particularly costly or large in magnitude. This does not 
necessarily mean that USAID or the Department of the Army were more committed to 
nation-building instead of state-building or society-building, but rather that in order to be able 
to complete the largest projects it was necessary to invest large sums. Infrastructure is an 
example of costly projects that demands vast amounts of money, thereby partly explaining 
the extreme observations. 
 
2.6.3 Society-building 
 
 
Table	  8	  
 
As in the case of state-building and nation-building, society-building projects also lacked 
support from some of the extending agencies. Department of Commerce and Department of 
the Treasury are as previously stated preoccupied with economics and thereby fall outside of 
society-building criteria. Department of Homeland Security is preoccupied with state-
building, which is also true for Department of Justice. Department of Labor does not 
contribute with aid that is aimed at the civil society. Department of Transportation had, as 
Total, median and average aid from agency for society-building (million USD)
Extending agency Total Median Average
U.S. Agency for International Development 2390,69523 1,5983 20,97101079
Department of State 217,17131 0,102 1,820927368
Department of the Army 159,65973 6,247285 19,95746625
Department of Agriculture 123,87817 8,24506 20,64636167
Department of Defense 108,51653 10,14923 21,703306
Department of Health and Human Services 34,59762 0,12077 1,820927368
Department of Commerce 0 0 0
Department of Homeland Security 0 0 0
Department of Justice 0 0 0
Department of Labor 0 0 0
Department of the Treasury 0 0 0
Department of Transportation 0 0 0
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previously stated, only one project in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 that was for 
transportation, which is infrastructure, and is a criteria for nation-building. 
 USAID contributed with most aid in total for society-building as well, and was far 
ahead of Department of State, which contributed with second to most in total. At the same 
time, Department of State contributed with aid for 63 % of the total amount of society-
building projects, meaning they invested in far more projects than any of the other extending 
agencies. USAID contributed with aid for 28 % of the total amount of society-building 
projects, which is a lot of the projects, but still far less than Department of State. This implies 
that because of the nature of society-building projects, Department of State can be said to 
have contributed the most because they were able to reach out to more people through the 
amount of projects they contributed aid for.  
 The difference between average and median contribution per project reveals 
differences in the project budget size also for society-building, although these differences are 
smaller than for nation- and state-building projects. The reason for this is arguably the nature 
of society-building projects being characterized by smaller budgets, which means that the 
total amount of projects may be larger than for nation- and state-building projects without 
spending as much money. 
 Department of Defense contributed with the largest amount of aid with regard to 
median contribution per society-building project, which implies that they were contributing 
with significant sums for the 1 % of the total amount of projects they contributed for. 
Department of State’s median contribution per project was the lowest of all the median 
contributions, underlining that the society-building projects may have quite small budgets. As 
noted, for society-building this does not necessarily mean anything about the commitment of 
the agency, and it is still arguably explained by how the Department of State was the agency 
with the largest impact on society-building. 
 
2.7 Comparing aid recipients by type 
The comparison will be done in three steps: First, there will be a comparison of the 
distribution among the extending agencies per type, second there will be a discussion of the 
purpose of the different aid projects as well as a discussion on the relevance of their size and 
scope, before moving on to a comparison of the total amount of aid allocated to each 
category. Finally there will be a conclusion, explaining what typology the U.S. government is 
most dedicated to. 
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2.7.1 Comparing the distribution of aid per extending agency 
The extending agency that contributed with most aid to Afghanistan (2007-2012) was 
USAID, which is not surprising considering it is the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. What is more surprising is that the amount of aid contributed by Department of 
Defense and Department of the Army. They both contributed to a moderate amount of 
projects, but the median contribution was mostly the largest for all the typologies, which 
made them important for the American aid effort, independent of typology.  
 
State-building 
When reviewing the numbers for state-building, it is evident that USAID provided the most 
amount of aid in total, and also funded the largest state-building project. This fact explains 
why USAID allocated the most aid for state-building projects because it was of a 
considerable size. Thus, USAID was a vital part of state-building, particularly for the 
building of the state apparatus and their ability to govern. The USAID-funded state-building 
projects were mainly aimed at governance and the building of the state apparatus, meaning 
they did not contribute in any significant degree to the ability to monopolize force. That is an 
interesting observation as it implies that USAID does not involve itself with violence, police 
work, or similar aspects of foreign aid, but stays true to its purpose of promoting peace, 
democracy and stability. 
 Department of Defense and Department of the Army contributed for some of the 
largest state-building projects with regard to the economic size. This explains their median 
contribution for state-building projects as they only contributed to respectively four and two 
projects each. State-building is a process that requires funding of projects that is more in line 
with the work of these two departments, referring to the monopolization of force particularly. 
Because of this, the projects that the two departments contributed to were mostly concerned 
with security, counter-narcotics and the rule of law. The importance of this is of a great 
matter when it comes to state-building, thereby the DoD and the DA are vital agencies for the 
possibility to succeed with state-building.  
 The Department of State funded the second to largest state-building project from 2007 
to 2012, but also some of the smaller projects, which explains the median contribution per 
project (3,33891). That particular project accounts for almost the entire contribution from the 
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DoS to state-building, meaning that it was an important agency for that particular project, but 
not as important for the overall state-building effort. 
 
Nation-building 
When reviewing the nation-building projects, it is evident that USAID was the definitive 
largest contributor for the total amount of aid, but also when looking at the median 
contribution per project. USAID’s foreign aid work is in many ways aimed at doing nation-
building work particularly building of infrastructure, democratic institutions (recognizing the 
citizens), as well as building the economy as part of a strategy to build a nation. USAID also 
contributes to conflict mitigation, which is a vital part of nation-building as it makes it 
possible to construct a national identity. Because of this, and the fact that USAID funded the 
most nation-building projects, it should be agreeable that it was the most important agency 
for the nation-building process.  
 The DoD contributed to quite large nation-building projects, as well as to a moderate 
amount of the projects, explaining the high median contribution per project. Although it was 
an important agency, the aid was mostly aimed at infrastructure projects, meaning it did work 
that enable to construct a national identity and give citizens a possibility to participate in the 
democratic process, but it is not the most important agency. Because it did not participate in 
the entire process and only contributed to a handful of projects, the DoD was more important 
to the specific projects it funded, rather than the entire nation-building effort. This was also 
the case for the DA as it contributed mostly for infrastructure and transportation. It funded 
more projects than the DoD, some smaller ones explaining the lower median contribution per 
project, but because the nature of the projects was mostly for infrastructure the DA had the 
same profile as the DoD. 
 
Society-building 
USAID was also the agency that contributed with the most aid in total for society-building, 
but with funding 28 % of the total amount of society-building projects, the median 
contribution per project was rather low. USAID funded the eight largest society-building 
projects, but also many smaller projects ending in the low median contribution. Nevertheless, 
USAID was an important agency for the society-building process in Afghanistan because of 
the large amount of aid in total, but also for funding many diverse projects. The DoD, DA 
and USDA were also important contributors for the society-building projects because they 
funded large projects. Because of that they were more important for those specific projects 
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than the entire society-building process, but none of these agencies were the most important 
for the society-building process. 
 The DoS funded 63 % of the society-building projects from 2007 to 2012. It spent 
second to most in total on these projects, but had a very low median contribution per project. 
As previously discussed the size of society-building projects are not as large as for nation- or 
state-building projects. Society-building is more dependent on reaching out to as many 
people as possible, not to fund the largest projects in Afghanistan, only benefiting the state 
apparatus. The amount of low cost society-building projects may do great difference for the 
people receiving the aid and for the entire Afghan civic society. Therefore it is arguably the 
DoS that was the most important agency for the American society-building efforts in 
Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. This is also because the DoS is the U.S. executive power of 
foreign policy and diplomatic issues, meaning they were possibly trying to establish a good 
relationship between the USA and the Afghan citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
When summing up the different agencies’ efforts it becomes evident that there are differences 
in their importance for each of the typologies. The state-building efforts were in largest extent 
made possible by the DoD and the DA, meaning they were vital agencies for the state-
building efforts, but they were not as important for the entire process of nation-building or 
society-building. For those two typologies they were more important for the specific projects 
they funded rather the entire process. When reviewing the nation-building efforts it is evident 
that USAID seems to have been the most important agency both because of its mission, and 
because of the extent of the contributions it made. The DoS seems to have been the most 
important agency for society-building. It is unfeasible to claim that one specific agency was 
the most important agency for the entire U.S. aid effort in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012, 
because the different agencies seem to exercise different level of influence, and thereby also 
different level of importance both for the different typologies, and for the total allocated aid 
variable. 
  
2.7.2 Comparison of the projects’ purpose and the difference between 
small and large projects 
Reviewing the projects may enable a discussion and conclusion whether the size and purpose 
of the projects has something to do with the division among the typologies, and if some 
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projects seem more important than others. This is reviewed per typology before concluding 
on the matter. 
 
 
Table	  9	  
 
State-building 
A predominant number of the state-building projects received less than $ 10 million (76 % of 
the state-building projects), while only six of the projects received more than $ 100 million. 
Although there is a difference in the amount of money given to the projects, there are similar 
purposes for each of them. Mainly there have been given aid for counter narcotic work, 
weapon destruction, enabling the executive function of the state, and training of Afghan 
personnel in order to enable them to enforce laws. The larger projects seem to have been 
more broadly based aid, while smaller projects may have been aimed more locally. This 
implies that the large projects were important because of the amount of money being donated, 
rather than the specific purpose intended for them. Thereby size does not matter significantly 
for state-building projects, as every project serve similar purposes in support for a collective 
state-building effort. 
 
Nation-building 
The distribution of aid among the nation-building projects was more diverse than for the 
state-building projects. 15 projects received more than $ 100 million, 7 received between $ 
100 million and $ 50 million, 24 projects received between $ 10 million and $ 50 million, 
while 75 projects received less than $ 10 million. The smallest projects had the purpose of 
Amount of projects per typology by total economic size (million USD) 
(2007-2012)
State-building Nation-building Society-building
> $ 100 6 15 7
$ 50 - $ 99 0 7 9
$ 10 - $ 49 6 24 26
< $ 10 39 75 372
51 121 414
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being technical assistance in different matters, while the medium sized projects went to water 
and sanitation, education, and electricity. The largest projects’ purpose was transportation, 
economic growth, conflict mitigation, and general reconstruction. In other words there were 
different purpose according to the size of the projects. That does not necessarily indicate a 
difference in importance, but rather that the largest projects were more costly and more 
broadly based than the smaller projects. Thus, the nation-building projects differed in size, 
but as with the state-building projects this does not indicate that it affects the division of the 
projects into the three typologies. 
 
 
Society-building 
The society-building projects mainly received less than $ 10 million (372 of the projects or 
90 % of the society-building projects), while some received between $ 10 and $ 100 million 
(35 projects), and just 7 projects received more than $ 100 million (2 % of the society-
building projects). The projects were mostly similar in purpose, whether it was for food aid, 
women’s rights, health services, or victims’ assistance. Thus, the projects’ purposes thus do 
not differ in importance, as is also the case for state- and nation-building. Society-building 
projects do differ from state- and nation-building projects on one matter, which is the 
relationship between the size of the project and the relation to the typology. The high 
frequency of society-building projects that are small in size, provides appropriate evidence 
that small projects tend to be society-building, rather than nation- or state-building projects. 
 
Conclusion 
The size of the projects seem to have one effect on the division among the typologies, which 
is that the smaller the projects are, the greater the probability is that they are society-building 
projects. It is not a mutually exclusively observation, but the probability increases according 
Percentages of Table 9
State-building Nation-building Society-building
> $ 100 12 % 12 % 2 %
$ 50 - $ 99 0 % 6 % 2 %
$ 10 - $ 49 12 % 20 % 6 %
< $ 10 76 % 62 % 90 %
Table	  10 
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to how small the amount of funding for the project is. When it comes to the purposes of the 
projects, this will off course have an effect on the division on which typology they will be 
divided into, but the purposes of the projects within the different typologies do not seem to 
have any relation to the amount of money funded, or the size of the projects, except for some 
projects demanding more funding than others in order to accomplish the purposes (such as 
costly projects with the purpose of building infrastructure). 
 
2.7.3 Comparing the total spending and amount of projects per typology 
Comparing the total amount of aid spent per does not reveal an exclusive conclusion to begin 
with. Nation-building, which received 46 % of the total allocated aid (2007-2012), can be 
claimed to be the U.S. government’s highest prioritized goal, followed by state-building 
(33%), and finally nation-building (22 %). But, this changes when considering the 
distribution of projects per typology. 71 % of the projects were society-building projects, 
thereby in this sense society-building arguably was what the U.S. government related the 
most to as well. The only typology that does not have the highest priority regarding projects 
or money is state-building, but at the same time this typology received second to most 
money. The point is that it is difficult to conclude on the background of total sums. 
Considering that society-building projects tend to have smaller budgets than state- or nation-
building projects, it costs less to do society-building. The effect is that the impact of the 
society-building projects on the civic society is perhaps as big as state-building projects are 
on the state. Therefore the U.S. government’s society-building efforts can be considered to be 
just as important as the state-building efforts. 
 What may separate the prioritisation of the typologies is the size of certain projects. 
Some projects with very big budgets may outperform the total budget. Below is a distribution 
of the five projects that received the largest amount of money in total from 2007 to 2012, for 
each of the three typologies (Table 9). As is visible in the table, state-building was the 
typology with the two largest projects, whereby one was for the executive function of the 
public sector, while the other was for counter narcotics and law enforcement. Both these 
kinds of projects operate at the core of the conditions for state-building and represent the 
largest focus of the state-building projects. The remaining three state-building projects on the 
top five list were smaller in economic size, whereby the fifth project was just 1/10 of the 
largest project. This indicates that there were several smaller state-building projects as well, 
but the large, more general projects were prioritised when it comes to giving to state-
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building. The top five state-building projects accounted for 93 % of the total aid for state-
building projects, further highlighting that state-building projects were few, but large in size. 
 The five largest nation-building projects were not as big as the two largest state-
building projects, but the money was more evenly distributed per project than for state-
building. This is consistent with the idea of nation-building projects being large in size, as it 
is for such measures as infrastructure, which are costly and time-consuming, meaning there is 
a need for large amounts of money. There were three kinds of projects within the top five: 
Infrastructure projects, economic growth projects and conflict mitigation projects. The first 
two kinds are both related to the practical preconditions necessary for nation-building, while 
the final group is vital for the creation of a national identity. Thus, the top five nation-
building projects are good representations of the entire nation-building effort. The top five 
projects accounted for 56 % of the total nation-building aid effort, thereby underlining that 
nation-building projects are quite evenly large in size. 
 
 
Table	  11	  	  
The five largest society-building projects were significantly smaller than the state- and 
nation-building projects, but as previously discussed, society-building projects are much 
smaller on an economic scale. At the same time, the top five projects accounted for 44 % of 
the total amount of aid allocated for society-building efforts. This means that the top five 
projects were quite large when comparing them to the rest of the society-building projects. 
The amount of money spent on each of the top five society-building projects was relatively 
evenly distributed, which fits well with the idea of society-building projects. 
Top five projects per typology (million USD)
State-building Nation-building Society-building
Project name Money spent Project name Money spent Project name Money spent
Public'Sector'Execu/ve'
Func/on
1734,70073 Commander's'Emergency'
Response'Program'(CERP):'
Transporta/on
849,09953 Local'Government'and'
Decentraliza/on
409,68321
Interna/onal'Narco/cs'&'Law'
Enforcement:'Country'Program
1418,6363 Transport'Services 821,66725 Agricultural'Sector'Produc/vity 350,21656
InKCountry'Counternarco/cs'
Program
706,758 Modern'Energy'Services 697,45275 Maternal'and'Child'Health 258,83083
Na/onal'Defense'Authoriza/on'
Act'(NDAA):'Special'Overseas'
Con/ngency'Opera/ons'
funding'authority'to'support'
TFBSO'Programs
203,25661 Economic'Growth'and'
Development
694,99133 Commodity'Cost'of'USAID'Title'
II'Food'Aid'for'Other'Emergency
158,5844
Interna/onal'Narco/cs'&'Law'
Enforcement:'An/KCrime'
Programs
177,21613 Conﬂict'Mi/ga/on 493,64397 Crisis'Assistance'and'Recovery 153,43255
Total 4240,56777 Total 3556,85483 Total 1330,74755
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 The conclusion is that the U.S. government did nation-building, state-building and 
society-building when contributing with developmental aid to Afghanistan from 2007 to 
2012, thereby confirming H497. Although, when reviewing the distribution of aid for the 
different typologies per year, it becomes clear that the priority shifted somewhat from year to 
year. Graph 2 shows that nation-building was the most prioritized typology from 2007 to 
2011, which may confirm H298. From 2011 to 2012 circumstances changed and both nation-
building and society-building decreased, while state-building increased, leaving state-
building clearly on top and partly confirming H199. The shift in priority implies that the U.S. 
government’s aid efforts in Afghanistan were dependent on the situation in Afghanistan. 
After 2011 it became clear that the U.S. troops would return to the U.S. within a short time 
period, meaning that the American aid effort had to be rushed. State-building is a less time 
consuming process than nation-building, which may explain the shift in priority. Society-
building, on the other hand, was (except from 2011) the typology with the lowest priority. As 
discussed earlier, the amount of aid per project separates society-building from state- and 
nation-building, but the purposes of society-building are also different from nation- and state-
building. Society-building has a purpose of building and aiding the civic society, but not the 
state itself, while state- and nation-building are both preoccupied with building a state 
apparatus. Society-building is also the typology that is possible to maintain with a lower level 
of cost over time, because of the nature of the projects’ size and need of funding. This means 
that society-building can be continued in the same manner as before because it always aids 
some projects even though the budget level is low, while nation- and state-building projects 
need a larger budget. Including the amount of society-building projects from 2007-2012, it is 
also possible to partly confirm H3100. Because of this, there are no grounds for claiming that 
H1-3 are confirmed, thereby H4 must be the conclusion. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Considering the elaborated evidence and observations above, it is difficult to conclude on one 
single note. The overall implications are that the U.S. government in largest extent did 
nation-building when contribution with aid to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. At the same 
time the effect of the low cost society-building projects may have reached further than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to state-building, nation-
building, and society-building. 
98 The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to nation-building. 
99 The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to state-building. 
100 The American government’s aid effort in Afghanistan (2007-2012) was related to society-building. 
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expensive nation-building projects. Analysing the changes in priority between the three 
typologies from year to year also provides divergent evidence for the main priority of the 
different typologies. In essence, all of these observations must end in the conclusion that H4 
is proved regarding the overall aid efforts analysed. The changing priority may show a trend 
for the time period after 2012, where state-building had the highest priority, but this will only 
end in speculations. Nation-building was a vital part of the U.S. aid efforts, but it is time-
consuming and thereby it is not surprising that its priority fell towards the end of the U.S. 
military operation in Afghanistan. After these considerations hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 are 
then rejected and hypothesis H4 is confirmed, which means that the U.S. aid efforts in 
Afghanistan were a combination of state-building, nation-building, and society-building. 	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3 Foreign policy traditions, foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan, U.S. Afghan aid, 
and American interests 
 
 
The connection between foreign policy traditions, foreign policy goals and the U.S. aid 
efforts in Afghanistan are implied, but not yet revealed within this thesis. This final chapter 
will discuss these connections. The chapter consists of four parts: A presentation of U.S. 
foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012; a comparison of American 
foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for 2007-2012 and the results presented in chapter 2; 
reflections on the development from nation-building towards state-building efforts in 
Afghanistan and its relation to American policy towards Afghanistan; a short discussion of 
American interests in Afghanistan; reflections on American foreign policy traditions and the 
observations made in chapter 2. 
 
3.1 U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan (2007-2012) 
In order to enable a complete discussion on American foreign policy, foreign aid, and what 
types of development is central for the American government, it is necessary to review the 
U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan during the years analysed in this thesis (2007-2012). 
American foreign policy and strategies are rarely concretely pronounced to the public and 
must in some degree be interpreted in order to be understood. The U.S. Embassy in Brussels 
has released a series of dossiers that are supposed to “… highlight the priorities of the US 
Government with regard to specific foreign policy policy [sic] issues … [by providing] 
statements by U.S. public officials, but also reports, hearings, and journal articles.”101 Thus, 
the source of American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan cannot be found in a concrete 
description of such policy, but must be inferred from general statements of foreign policy and 
other relevant documents. Therefore, the following explanation of U.S. foreign policy goals 
in Afghanistan is based on information and perspectives gathered from Senate hearings, CRS 
Congressional reports, and statements issued by presidents Obama and Karzai.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Embassy of the United States, "Afghanistan - United States Policy toward Afghanistan & Pakistan: A 
Dossier,"  http://www.uspolicy.be/dossier/afghanistan-united-states-policy-toward-afghanistan-pakistan-dossier. 
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 The empirical evidence of this thesis is deduced from the analysis of U.S. foreign aid 
work in Afghanistan, but there was also a large military effort in Afghanistan. This effort, 
particularly focusing on security, is an aspect that will be discussed in some degree when 
reviewing the American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan. Because it is not part of the 
quantitative analysis it will not be taken into consideration in the same depth as the civic aid 
work. This is a limitation for this thesis, but considering the frame of the thesis work, it does 
not impair the quality of the discussion. It is important to note that civilian aid funded by 
military agencies fall within the scope of the research in this thesis, such as the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program. The military effort is seen as part of the state-building 
process because it enables monopolization of violence as well as enforcement of laws. 
 According to Kenneth Katzman, the Bush Administration decided it was necessary to 
launch a nation-building project rather than leaving the area devastated as a result of the U.S. 
lead military operations in 2001.102 This appears to have become a continuing policy, but not 
during the first years after the initial attack on Afghanistan. As the intervention in Bosnia left 
it dependent on aid, which it partly still is today, the Bush Administrations wanted to avoid a 
similar long-term commitment in Afghanistan to begin with, according to James Dobbins.103 
But, as Dobbins points out, a low level of commitment gives a low degree of results, and by 
2004 there was a shift in policy whereby the contribution of both military and civilian aid 
increased drastically. Richard A. Boucher104 pointed out that by 2007 the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan as a democratic nation was not finished and that there was a need to increase the 
nation building activities.105 According to Boucher, the strategy of the Bush Administration 
intertwined security, governance and reconstruction. Reconstruction was important in order 
to stabilise Afghanistan by connecting the country via building roads, but also by building 
electrical plants and through training government officials, as well as police forces.106 There 
was also a large focus on governance and law enforcement. These aspects of the Bush 
Administration’s Afghan policy were also relevant in 2008. Additionally were counter-
narcotic efforts necessary to increase food production, deal with the insurgents and impose 
law and order (noted by David T. Johnson, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,"(Embassy of the 
United States website: U.S. Congress, 2012), 9. 
103 Unites States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy?, 110th 
Congress, March 8, 2007. 
104 Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 2006-2009. 
105 Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy? 
106 Afghanistan: Time for a New Strategy? 
	  55	  
Enforcement Affairs).107 The goal in 2008 was still, as noted by Boucher, to “… defeat the 
insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability based on Afghan national 
sovereignty, democratic principles, and respect for human rights.”108 This hints at a still on 
going process of nation building to a much larger extent than initially intended. 
 After Barack Obama won the election and was inaugurated as president in 2009, 
Katzman noted a difference in policy towards Afghanistan: “The Obama Administration’s 
strategy review in late 2009 narrowed official U.S. goals to preventing terrorism safe haven 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”109 At the same time, Katzman claims that the Obama 
Administration continued the nation-building policy, and in some aspects might have even 
expanded it: “No matter how expansively the U.S. mission has been defined, building the 
capacity of and reforming Afghan governance— particularly reducing governmental 
corruption—have been consistently and widely judged to be key to the success of U.S. 
policy.”110 Thus, the narrowing of the foreign policy goals made by the Obama 
Administration had to be an expansion of the policy goals in Afghanistan. But, other’s 
opinions, such as Rory Stewart111, claimed that the Obama Administration narrowed its focus 
only to counter-terrorism, which he related to state-building.112 Furthermore, Stewart argued 
that the strategy was likely to fail, based on a belief that the state had to be built by an Afghan 
national movement, and not by foreign states. His reasoning for this was that the Afghan 
society is spread over a vast and rough area with strong traditions of local self-governance. If 
Afghanistan was to be built by an Afghan national movement, the use of nation-building 
would be more effective than the use of state-building, because one of its attributes focuses 
on the creation of a national identity, which is arguably necessary for the creation of a 
national Afghan movement. Senator John Kerry also shared the perception of a narrowed 
policy in which he claimed that it was not an open-ended nation building exercise.113 
 In 2009 President Obama decided to increase the number of U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan in order to break the insurgents’ momentum, as a prelude to withdrawal.114 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide?, 110th 
Congress, January 31, 2008. 
108 Afghanistan: A Plan to Turn the Tide? 
109 Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 9. 
110 "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 9. 
111 Professor and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. 
112 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan, 111th 
Congress, September 16, 2009. 
113 United States Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, Afghanistan: Assessing the Road Ahead, 111th 
Congress, December 3 2009. 
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reoccurring phrase in many of the hearings, after the Obama Administration took charge of 
the foreign policy towards Afghanistan, was that Afghanistan should not become a safe-
haven for terrorists. Richard Holbrooke115 claimed the importance of security as a 
prerequisite for everything else, thereby further underlining the shift in policy towards 
counter-terrorism, and less focus on a nation building effort.116 The focus was also to create 
stable governments that could withstand Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Francis J. West concluded in 
2011 that the U.S. was past a mission of nation building and had to shift focus to prevent 
safe-havens for terrorists. This position correlates with Katzman’s arguments on the shift in 
the Obama Administration policy.117 
 At the same time as the Obama Administration shifted the policy focus from nation-
building to security in 2009, then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in a hearing in 2011, 
elaborated on the Obama Administrations foreign policy at that point in time: Clinton 
explained that the current Obama Administration policy goals in Afghanistan focused on 
expansion of civilian support, to give Afghans a stake in their country’s future and provide 
alternatives to extremism and insurgency, a larger focus on tribal councils, as well as a shift 
from short term to long term stabilisation.118 This indicates that there were conflicting policy 
goals within the Obama Administration, but also underlines that the Obama Administration 
still continued the nation-building work, even though there was an increased focus on 
security. On the other hand, several Senate and House hearings revealed (in 2011) that many 
government officials, as well as non-government advisors were more preoccupied with 
Pakistan than Afghanistan.  The increased focus on Pakistan, and the pressure for a shift in 
focus being put on the administration was arguably the reason for the increased focus on 
security and state-building efforts in Afghanistan, which could enable a faster retraction of 
troops. In addition, a faster retraction of troops and funding from Afghanistan would enable a 
focus on economic issues at home, as well as a larger engagement with Pakistan. This would 
undoubtedly collide with the Obama Administration’s goal of stabilising Afghanistan in a 
long-term perspective, because that would demand a long-term U.S. commitment. All these 
differing aspects indicate that the Obama Administration’s policy goals in Afghanistan were 
conflicting and lacked a shared focus, meaning that the strategy for the implementation of the 
aid work also could be conflicting. 	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 In 2013 Obama and Karzai released a joint statement summarising some of the policy 
goals that would be sought after the withdrawal of American troops. Among these policy 
goals were the continued work to enable Afghan security forces to take over the security 
responsibility in Afghanistan, continue growth and stabilisation of the Afghan economy, and 
continue peace meetings between tribal societies.119 
 A major part of the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan in general was, and is, the 
provision of security for Afghan citizens. Because this was a military effort it will just be 
taken into consideration, because the thesis main focus lies on civic aid. Providing security 
and training Afghan personnel to take charge, as foreign soldiers return to their respective 
states, was an important aspect of the American foreign policy goals. It is also an important 
aspect for the civic aid work because some degree of security is a necessity for aid workers. 
If there is no security it is very difficult, sometimes impossible, to do any work in the field. 
Hence, the American military effort is seen in context of the state-building process. Nation- 
and society-building can be used to broaden the state-building effort. The American military 
presence does not necessarily correlate with the civilian efforts, but considerations are made 
because of the connection to state-building. 
 
3.2 Comparison of American foreign policy goals and 
the results of the quantitative analysis 
Comparing the American policy goals in Afghanistan (as presented above) and the results of 
the quantitative analysis will reveal if the U.S. government was consistent in the 
implementation of aid, which was supposed to realise the presented policy goals. First and 
foremost it is important to point out that the American foreign policy towards Afghanistan 
(2007-2012) does not set specific goals that can be pertained to the individual projects. The 
overall goals however, can be pertained to the observations regarding the typologies and the 
reasoning behind the definition of each typology, because the foreign policy goals presented 
in part 3.1 are characterized by setting general goals for the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.  
 The initial military operations in Afghanistan did not presuppose a long-term 
commitment, as the Bush administration wanted to make less of an impact in Afghanistan to 
begin with. It did not take long before decision-makers realised it was necessary to change 
attitude towards the region not to repeat history (the intervention against the Soviet Union 	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supported Afghan government in the 1980s), meaning to leave Afghanistan un-aided after 
dismantling its Taliban government. Although the data analysed in chapter 2 are from after 
the shift in policy in 2004, it is clear that the total amount of American aid being given to 
Afghanistan increased from 2007-2009, while stabilising at a high level from 2009-2012. 
This proves that the policy of aiding Afghan society and state was fulfilled for the years 
researched. It also proves that after the Obama Administration took charge of the policy 
towards Afghanistan there was an increase of aid, as well as a stabilisation at high levels of 
aid expenditures. In addition to this, Boucher’s solicitation for a need to increase the nation 
building activities in 2007 seems to have had an impact because of the overall increase in aid, 
but also because of an increase in the aid directed at the nation-building typology, and 
because several projects were supposed to do reconstruction. 
 Boucher also pointed out in 2007 that reconstruction was an important factor in 
stabilising Afghanistan, which correlates with the theory of nation-building. As the allocated 
aid for nation-building projects increased from 2007-2009 it arguably proves that there was a 
commitment to nation-building efforts, also because it was the typology that had the highest 
priority according to the aid expenditures. 
 The focus of the American policy to base the Afghanistan state on democratic 
principles, hinting at shaping it like a Western state, is not an easy task to prove by reference 
to specific projects. The reason for this is that there are extremely few projects that are 
described as having the purpose of building democracy. The American aid efforts clearly 
show traits of trying to provide infrastructure, mitigating conflict between tribal societies in 
order to create peace, and building an executive sector in Afghanistan. This shows an 
intention of creating a stable democratic state, but as the American policy can be based on 
some sort of ideology it is difficult to specifically prove that they tried, or were able, to create 
a democracy. There were projects related to creating a societal commitment among the 
Afghan citizens, but these projects lacked the description on how and why to do this. Thus it 
is not possible to conclude that the American aid efforts correlate with that particular policy 
goal. 
 The Obama Administration’s narrowing of the policy goals in Afghanistan, to prevent 
terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan, also cannot be specifically confirmed by the 
observations made in chapter 2. The reason for this is partly because that policy goal 
presupposed the use of military aid, but also because it is such a broad goal that is difficult to 
prove when using rather specific project descriptions. What can be confirmed in relation to 
the narrowing of the policy goal is Katzman’s claim that the Obama Administration expanded 
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the nation building policy. The total amount of aid, as stated earlier, increased after the 
Obama Administration took charge of the Afghan policy. In addition, the nation-building 
efforts increased in total, while the state-building efforts decreased in priority (2010) (see 
Graph 2). This then indicates a focus on creating a stable state by encouraging the Afghan 
people to agree upon a national identity, whereby especially building infrastructure in order 
to enable better communication, a vital nation-building tool, was being used. 
 In 2011 Clinton clarified that the Obama Administration’s policy towards 
Afghanistan emphasised the importance of expanding civilian support. Clinton did not clarify 
the term further, but if it is to be interpreted as support for civilian society it does correlate 
with the increase of aid for society-building projects from 2010-2011, confirming a 
correlation between the policy and the aid efforts. Although this proves some degree of 
correlation, the following year the aid for society-building projects dropped by almost 40 %, 
revealing that the civilian support was not as prioritized as Clinton argued in 2011. This may 
relate to the then upcoming retraction of American troops as also the nation-building projects 
received less aid in 2012, while state-building projects received more aid in 2012 than any 
other of the years researched. I see this as related to the apparent shift of priority; the Obama 
Administration’s goal of retraction required a strategy that increased the effort to build a state 
that could obtain and hold stability. Therefore the focus turned to state-building, because that 
is a form of development that potentially is less time-consuming. 
 The American policy goals in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012 do correlate to some 
degree with the observations made in chapter 2. Mitigating conflicts, building infrastructure, 
supporting society-building work, and an increased focus on security are policies/policy goals 
that correlate with the observations in chapter 2. Although some policy goals correlate with 
the observations in the quantitative analysis, that is not the case for all the policy goals; the 
decrease of spending on nation-building and society-building projects does not correlate with 
the policy goal of long-term stability and building an Afghan society on democratic ideals. 
The most likely reason for this is the announcement by President Obama of his intention to 
withdraw a large part of the American forces over several years, transferring the 
responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces by December 2014. It is obvious that 
the American government has provided much aid, and has continued to do so as well, but 
pragmatic reasoning seems to have undermined the policy profile of American aid for 
Afghanistan. Because of the changing and difficult conditions in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
government potentially had to alter the policy strategy in order to make it applicable for the 
changing conditions, or perhaps to enable fulfilment of American interests. On the other 
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hand, the reassertion of the security dilemma may have decreased the commitment to nation-
building, or perhaps there were differing opinions within the Obama Administration, which 
both can lead to contradictions in regard to policy goals. The withdrawal of troops could be 
the source of the shift in focus across the three typologies, as the build of the Afghan 
government had to be more hastily done. State-building may be an effective way of building 
a state anew, but it is not necessarily a long-term stabilisation as the viability of the state 
often is non-existent. For long-term stability the use of nation-building theory seems to be a 
strategy with far more potential, but it is a time-consuming and expensive process, which 
under the circumstances with domestic economical problems was not a good solution for the 
American government. 
 
3.3 The shift of priority from nation-building to state-
building related to U.S. policy towards Afghanistan 
The results of the quantitative analysis in chapter 2 revealed a development in the U.S. 
priority between the different typologies, in which the most interesting aspect of it was the 
shift in priority from nation-building aid to state-building aid. The reason for this being an 
interesting aspect is that those two projects differ in how to strategize building of stability. 
The nation-building strategy is a costly long-term commitment because it takes time to have 
citizens in a failed state agree on a national identity. First of all, in Afghanistan in particular, 
it is necessary to build infrastructure to help transportation and communication in order to 
give the different tribal societies an opportunity to come together and communicate. The 
importance of infrastructure is immense, and in a country as poorly developed as Afghanistan 
this is a large task to take on. After finishing the costly and time-consuming work of building 
the infrastructure, logically the next phase is to gather tribal communities in order to mitigate 
conflicts. After conflicts that have been going on for centuries have been resolved in such an 
extent that it is possible to discuss similarities, the next phase is to get these differing tribal 
communities to agree upon a common identity; or at least to acknowledge that they have 
some common interests at a national level, such as peace, freedom to do things their way, and 
the ability to influence national policies that affects them. Hippler explains (see section 1.6) 
that the group identities do not necessarily need to be lost, but that the national identity must 
surpass the different group identities. In order to create a nation it is important that the 
common identity is imbedded in all groups, otherwise it is difficult to attain stability among 
the different rural societies, and thereby also national stability. Only when the national 
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identity surpasses the group identities is this a possibility. The groups can be tribal societies, 
but also religious groups, women, and other minorities. Tribal societies can be a tougher 
challenge than other groups as they can be territorial, and many of them in Afghanistan are 
lead by warlords. This could potentially become a factor that stall the process of creating a 
national identity, but I will argue that it is still potentially possible as long as there is time to 
mitigate. The American society consists of groups of different cultural heritage, but at the 
same time there is a national identity, which is an example of how the national identity may 
surpass group identities. But there is still room for the group identities as long as the groups 
conform to the overarching national identity. 
  As surely can be understood, this process may not even be possible to execute in the 
first place, but if it is it will take time. If it is possible to gather such conflicting communities 
on an established idea of a national identity and the idea that they share common interests, it 
will enable a stable society without severe conflicts. Also, if there is a collective identity that 
all Afghan citizens can identify themselves with, it will arguably be a unifying point in times 
of national or international crisis. Also, in the process of accomplishing this, infrastructure 
has been built, helping the creation of a national economy tying all parts of Afghanistan 
together, then again contributing to further development. Because of these aspects, nation-
building is a time-consuming process, but the outcome of it is potentially long-term stability. 
 The state-building strategy differs from nation-building in many ways, especially 
characterized by the possibly rushed effort to put together a minimum state apparatus, which 
is able to have a scope and strength, as well as to monopolise violence in order to enforce 
laws. This can be less time-consuming, as building a state apparatus does not mean that the 
apparatus is the most efficient or the best version of the state, but rather that it is able to 
perform coercion and a minimum of stability. In Afghanistan, the ability to enforce laws and 
provide security has for many years been executed by American and allied troops, while 
spending a lot of time training Afghan military personnel and police forces. This is costly as 
long as it is an on-going commitment, but as it is such a costly effort for the foreign states 
contributing in Afghanistan it is not something that can be upheld for a long time, and in 
December 2014, the security responsibility was transferred to the Afghan forces.  
 The other aspects of state-building that are part of the research are the building of a 
minimum of state apparatus and the training of Afghan personnel. These efforts are not 
particularly time-consuming, nor are they costly in a long-term aspect. As soon as the state 
apparatus is strong enough to exercise the minimum of control, the goal of state-building in 
relation to the state apparatus is accomplished. The same can also be said in regard to the 
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training of Afghan personnel; when they are able to do a minimum of police and security 
work, having monopolized force and being able to enforce laws, it is not necessary to fund 
the state-building efforts any more. This presupposes that the state apparently has a source of 
revenue independent of outside power, and that the security forces are sufficiently trained and 
motivated. In my opinion it is not necessarily possible to be certain that these prerequisites 
are in place before retraction, as retraction will be the real test of the ability of the state. 
There may also be other aspects that influence the foreign state’s commitment to the 
receiving state. Aspects such as the foreign states domestic economy, political priorities, and 
more critical emergencies other places, may influence the decision to withdraw. If the foreign 
state’s perception is that the minimal state system should be able to support itself and have 
other incentives to withdraw as well, it is arguably a possibility that the foreign state 
withdraws to early. An example of this is the American-trained Iraqi army, which did not 
have the will to fight ISIS in Mosul, Iraq.120 
  State-building is characterized by being a small footprint effort where the 
commitment to the receiving state expires when the essential traits of state-building are 
achieved. Because of this the stability of a state following a state-building effort is arguably 
short-term as the aid and guidance of a developed state can cease quite quickly. The minimal 
state apparatus can be a source of dictatorship as a minimal apparatus arguably consists of a 
few persons that are coordinating the apparatus, thereby putting them in a position of power, 
especially if it controls a military or police force capable of monopolising violence. If the 
state apparatus and its national forces are not strong enough to do this, the state could 
possibly erupt into chaos because of the lack of stabilising powers. Because of all this, state-
building can be a short-term effort that possibly creates short-term stability, which 
distinguishes it to large extent from the earlier nation-building effort during the period when 
an important goal of American foreign policy goal was to re-build Afghanistan on democratic 
principles. An authoritarian regime may be stable, but it is often an ‘ugly’ regime, meaning 
that the leader/state does not consider the interests of the citizens, but just the state or the 
authoritarian leader. An authoritarian regime does not necessarily stay stable, because of the 
narrow support, but if it is able to stay stable it may be a better solution than a failed state in 
complete chaos. Although that may be the case, the U.S. foreign policy goal of increased 
civilian support, and building Afghanistan on democratic principles, does not give any 
consistent and logical arguments for turning to state-building efforts in Afghanistan. 	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 American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012 contains some 
contradictory statements on long-term versus short-term stability, as well as an intended 
evolvement of stabilising efforts in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration’s initial intention 
of making a small imprint in Afghanistan evolved into a nation building effort. Because it 
was not initially intended to be a nation building effort, it is possible to claim that the initial 
years of nation building work done by the Bush Administration was a moderate effort, which 
is observable in the analysis in chapter 2: The aid to Afghanistan for the years 2007-2009 
increases moderately and there seems to be no large shift in priority of the different 
typologies, except for a slightly larger increase in state-building project funding. The goal in 
2008 was, according to Boucher, to create long-term stability.  
 In 2009, when Barack Obama was inaugurated, his administration claimed to narrow 
the focus of the policy goals in Afghanistan, but in reality they might have expanded it. A 
narrowing of focus does not necessarily mean to decrease funding; a narrowing, or a focusing 
of policy may result in more specific goals. Because of that it can be easier to define the 
tactics of the work that has to be done, thereby increasing knowledge on what to fund in 
order to reach the goal. When combining this with the plan to withdraw American troops it is 
a logical consequence that funding will increase in order to fulfil the narrowed policy goals 
before the American presence in Afghanistan decreased significantly. There was an increased 
focus on security, which is related to state-building because the ability to enforce law is a 
vital part of state-building. This correlates with the observations in chapter 2, as from 2010 
the funding for state-building projects increases drastically until 2012 (Graph 2, chapter 2). 
Although there is positive correlation between the increased focus on security and the priority 
of state-building projects, the state-building projects in the analysis were not directly security 
in the sense that they contained military purposes. The security aspects of the state-building 
projects from the analysis were mostly the training of police forces and weapons control, as 
well as counter-narcotic projects that contributed to reducing criminal groupings that were 
often connected in some way (often involuntarily) to the insurgents. Although the specific 
projects analysed are not directly connected to the referenced means of providing security, it 
is an important aspect of state-building (American military contribution), which is a process 
and not merely the provision of security. Therefore there is strong correlation between the 
foreign policy goal of providing security and the increase in funding for state-building 
projects. 
 Although there was an increased focus on security after the Obama Administration 
focused the policy towards Afghanistan, Clinton spoke of a shift from short-term to long-
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term stability. This would indicate a shift from a state-building strategy to a nation-building 
strategy, but the result of the analysis in chapter 2 shows that from 2010 to 2012 the funding 
of nation-building projects decreased drastically, especially from 2011 to 2012. Hence, 
Clinton’s statement represents a political bias in the sense that her statement seems to have 
been set in opposition to the Bush Administrations policies, but the fact is that they seemed to 
work towards the same goal. Boucher stated in 2008 (Bush Administration) that the goal was 
to return Afghanistan to long-term stability, indicating that a nation-building strategy was 
already in place. At the same time as funding for nation-building and society-building 
decreased, the funding of state-building projects increased drastically, especially from 2011 
to 2012. This does not correlate with the goal of a shifting focus towards long-term stability, 
because, as I have argued, nation-building inherently is the strategy that creates the best 
conditions for long-term stability, where the state in the least extent is recognized by the 
citizens, and in the greatest extent is based on democratic principles. 
 The Obama Administrations narrowing of the policy goals thereby resulted in a shift 
in priority from a nation-building to a state-building strategy, but that was not consistent with 
their foreign policy goal of creating long-term stability, because of the potential pitfalls of 
state-building. Nation-building on the other hand (when it works) has a potential to be a far 
more stable state. There was also a lack of consistency in the Obama Administration’s policy 
goal with regard to the increased focus on security and the deployment of more troops, at the 
same time as Clinton claimed that they were shifting the focus from short-term to long-term 
stability. An increased focus on security is not compatible with long-term stability in the 
sense that security is a state-building trait, and as discussed above, state-building as a strategy 
does not necessarily create long-term stability. There is off course a necessary predisposition 
to have some level of security in order to develop a failed state because it makes it possible to 
work out in the field, but when the major focus is on security and not on development it 
comes in the way of development and long-term stability, at least for a state built on 
democratic principles. 
 The Bush Administration had already established a nation-building strategy according 
to the stated policy, which is confirmed by the observations being made in chapter 2. Thus, if 
the Obama Administration wanted to create long-term stability they should have kept 
evolving the policies of the Bush Administration in order to accomplish their foreign policy 
goal, not narrow the focus down to security. It is understandable that the Obama 
Administration saw a need to decrease their military spending in Afghanistan, and their plan 
to increase troops to break the insurgents’ momentum before initiating the withdrawal of 
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American troops seems like a tactically sound plan, but it is not compatible with the intention 
of creating long-term stability by building a democratic state. The focus was drawn to a state-
building strategy, which does not presuppose democracy, or any recognition of the Afghan 
citizens whatsoever.  
 It is important to note that the results of the quantitative analysis is influenced by not 
including aid for military purposes and the American expenditures for their own troops in the 
quantitative analysis, because it does not balance out the typology distribution completely. 
The consequence may be that spending on state-building projects/costs appears to be lower 
than it actually was, because the quantitative analysis does not include the aforementioned 
expenditures. At the same time the intention of the analysis is to focus on aid aimed at the 
civilian Afghan community, and therefore I will argue that the results presented are valid, 
because at state earlier, the American military commitment is taken into consideration. 
 As noted in part 3.2, the withdrawal of American troops seem to have influenced the 
choice of strategy among the three strategies, resulting in a priority of state-building projects 
in 2012, two years from the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan forces. The 
initial priority of nation-building projects in 2007 was arguably consistent with the Bush 
Administration’s policy goal of returning Afghanistan to long-term stability. Even though the 
Obama Administration maintained a priority of nation-building projects until 2012, the trend 
pointed to a shift in priority. This shift in priority was consistent with the stated focus on 
security, but it was not consistent with Clinton’s statement on the shift from short-term to 
long-term stability, both because of the observations in the quantitative analysis proving a 
shift from nation-building to state-building, but also because the Bush Administration already 
had constructed a policy goal of creating long-term stability, and had initiated a nation-
building strategy. The conditions in Afghanistan and the success of previous nation-building 
efforts may have been unsuccessful or misguided, meaning the Obama Administration saw it 
as reasonable to alter the foreign policy towards Afghanistan. The consequence was an 
implementation of a state-building strategy, a strategy that potentially creates short-term 
stability, which in addition is likely to fall apart or turn into an oppressing authoritarian 
regime after the U.S. withdrew. This stands in opposition to the policy goal of building an 
Afghan state on democratic values. 
 
 
 
	  	  66	  
3.4 American interests in Afghanistan 
American interests in Afghanistan can in many ways be compared with Truman’s speech 
cited in part 1.4: There was a militant minority (Al-Qaeda) threatening the stability in 
Afghanistan, in addition also threatening the safety of American citizens in the USA. Foreign 
aid has also proven to be essential for the American ability to influence Afghan development. 
What is more important in relation to the definition of self-interest is what Truman said of 
totalitarian regimes: “… totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples … undermine the 
foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.”121 This is 
what I have argued is a link between the Truman Doctrine and realpolitik and I argue that this 
is also applicable for the case of Afghanistan. The initial intervention in Afghanistan, as 
discussed earlier, was deeply rooted in the Jacksonian tradition in which one of two major 
goals of Jacksonianism is to provide security for American citizens. Because Al-Qaeda 
threatened the security of both international peace, and the security of American citizens, it is 
closely related to the American use of realpolitik, proven with the example of the Truman 
Doctrine, because the security issue created an incentive for action. This was a pragmatic 
decision forced to the surface by the terrorist attack in the USA. The American interest of 
security for its own citizens did, in the case of Afghanistan, enable an evolvement that 
exceeded the initial reasoning for intervention, leading to other strategies and goals for both 
spreading and protecting American interests. Specifically, the American interests evolved 
from providing security for American citizens to spreading American ideals. 
 As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, by re-building and assisting Afghan 
authorities, the U.S. government was able to actively exercise influence on the future 
development of the Afghan society, both economically and democratically. Referring to 
Williams, American bilateral relations in most cases are based on promoting American 
interests, so it is reasonable to assume it is also the case for Afghanistan. In William’s book 
(referenced in part 1.4) it was also possible to establish that his Weltanschauung had some 
important main points that also can be applied for the case of Afghanistan: “… A penchant 
for externalizing evil … [and] [a]n unshakable confidence in American Exceptionalism and 
American beneficence.”122 The first point is relatable because the belief that domestic issues 
are related, or have roots abroad, meant that action was necessary in order to address the 
issue of security at home. In the case of the terrorist attacks it is not possible to disagree with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Truman, "Recommendation for Assistance," 3. 
122 Williams, Gardner, and Bacevich, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 319-20. 
	  67	  
this belief, which lead to the intervention in Afghanistan. The second point is relatable 
because American exceptionalist thought is not necessarily related to expanding American 
territory, but the spread of American ideals is important because, to some, it provides the 
base for a better world. 
 The definition of self-interest in relation to foreign aid has within this thesis been 
defined as foreign aid allocated for other purposes than pure humanitarian help, in which it 
fulfils a goal of the political strategy being used. In that context some possible areas of self-
interests will be discussed. One that will not be discussed further is American economic 
interest in Afghanistan because, as stated earlier, the withdrawal of American troops was 
arguably necessary in order to release funds that could help tackle domestic economic issues, 
but also because there seems to have been no economic advantages for the U.S. by investing 
in Afghanistan.  
 The first American interest is the U.S. government’s wish to correct the mistakes of 
the past, referring to how the U.S. government abandoned Afghanistan after aiding the 
Mujahedeen in the fight against the Soviet backed government. This was specifically 
mentioned in one of the Senate hearings cited in part 3.1, and seems to have become an 
argument for continued American support in Afghanistan, particularly regarding aid for 
civilians. The question then is, what does the U.S. government gain from this? In essence 
they could be able to forge a better relationship to both Afghan citizens and the Afghan 
authorities, but Afghanistan being a state ravaged by war for centuries, it is understandable 
that this relationship will take time to build, and it is dependent on American aid that is 
consistent and enables development. On the other hand, the use of the phrase ‘to correct the 
mistakes of the past’ may also be a strategic move by the U.S. government to be able to fulfil 
other American interests by constructing an initial trust between Afghan authorities and the 
U.S. government. There are particularly two American interests that may be fulfilled by using 
that strategy: Strategic interests and spreading American ideals.  
 American self-interest in the strategic positioning of Afghanistan can ultimately be 
summarized as geographical strategic interests, and the forging of friendly bonds to a state 
where the population predominantly are Muslims. American co-operation and forging of 
alliance with a predominantly Muslim state could potentially take the edge of some of the 
conflicting opinions between Western and Muslim states. It could work as a mitigating 
element against increasing hostility towards Western values. Building a Muslim state partly 
on Western ideals and forms of government, in which it actually functions well and enables 
development, can be a powerful tool, spreading incentive for similar states to perhaps 
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consider being willing to move in the same direction. Afghanistan’s geographic position is an 
important aspect of the strategic self-interest of the U.S. because it borders to both Iran and 
Pakistan. Having an allied state in that region could enable an increased degree of American 
pressure and control of those states via military co-operation with Afghanistan, as well as 
possibly building American military bases in Afghanistan. The latter does not seem to be 
within reach for a long time, but in the future, where the Afghan-American relationship 
possibly has strengthened, it may be an option the Afghan authorities and citizens would be 
able to support. Both these aspects of strategic interests are connected to two other interests 
that will be discussed at a later point: Stabilising the region, and forcing a closer co-operation 
with Pakistan (continuing the fight against extreme Islamism). 
 The second interest that can be related to correcting the mistakes of the past is as 
mentioned spreading American ideals, specifically freedom and democracy. As established in 
part 3.1 on American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan 
state, by introducing democratic principles, is an important goal of the American aid efforts 
in Afghanistan. It is not just a foreign policy goal, but it is related to foreign policy traditions 
through Wilsonianism, and in addition it is also observable in the results of the quantitative 
analysis, mainly by the extensive funding of nation-building projects. Nation-building 
projects partly try to establish an Afghan identity, which could create acceptance between the 
different tribal societies, connecting it to social values. The society-building projects aim to 
build a pluralistic society based on citizenship in the current Western model. Although the 
society-building projects were the least prioritized in regard to the total amount of funding, 
there were definitively most society-building projects. The society-building goal of engaging 
the civic society could potentially help the mitigation between different communities. This 
connects nation- and society-building, possibly creating a mutual increase of effect for both 
strategies. Because the American effort to do both nation-building and society-building are so 
strong, and because those two ways of developing a society are based on creating 
democracies through national identities and citizenship, there is a significant connection 
between the American effort to do nation- and society-building, and American self-interest.  
 Spreading American ideals is a combination of American Exceptionalism and 
expansionism. The belief that America is an exceptional state with exceptional ideals that are 
set to life through the governmental system is in my opinion essential in the wish to spread 
these ideals. The ability to lead by example and to display that these ideals actually have a 
function is important for those that wish to spread them, but more so to those that the U.S. 
government try to spread them to. Expansionism is a critical step in the process of spreading 
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these ideals abroad. If there was no willingness to spread democracy and freedom, these 
ideals would only appear in the USA, hence Wilsonianism seems to be an important factor, 
because it is based on spreading American ideals. 
 On the other hand, traits of Jacksonianism functions as incentive for the stabilisation 
of the Central Asia region. The stabilisation of the region is in a large degree connected to 
strategic interests, because stabilisation of Afghanistan will possibly provide for the physical 
security of American citizens by preventing a terrorist safe haven. These two aspects 
intermingle in the sense that the means of stabilisation and strategic interests are potentially 
attained in the same way; by intervention to remove the old authoritarian regime with ties to a 
militant minority. This is off course what the U.S. government did in 2001, and by removing 
the Taliban government and developing the Afghan society towards a democracy, it was in 
large extent able to stabilise the region, also pushing Al-Qaeda to the brinks, meaning that 
they disabled the terrorist organisation’s ability to plan and execute attacks in the U.S. This 
strategy has not necessarily worked in the long run, but for the years researched it had a 
significant effect. 
 The efforts to dissolve Al-Qaeda lead to several of the organization’s leaders to hide 
in Pakistan, among them i.e. Osama bin Laden. Taliban leaders did the same, resulting in a 
difficult situation for the U.S. government to dismantle both groups entirely. This brings 
forward the point on strategic interest’s connection with forcing a closer co-operation with 
Pakistan. In the explanation of U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, I brought attention 
to the increasing focus on Pakistan during Senate hearings. The initial intervention in 
Afghanistan was not to put pressure on Pakistan, but as American policy and policy goals 
evolved over time according to the realpolitik strategy, there was established an increasing 
pressure on the Obama Administration to co-operate more with Pakistan. Both Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban leaders were hiding in Pakistan, and the Pakistani authorities were not willing to 
extradite these persons. It would never have been an option to intervene in Pakistan because, 
even though it is not a state as developed as Western states, it has a significant degree of 
sovereignty, and among different vital aspects, it possesses nuclear weapons. The wish for 
increased co-operation, or perhaps influence on Pakistan, was rooted in the belief that 
Pakistan was a greater risk for American citizens security than Afghanistan was in the 
researched years 2010-2012. 
 The belief that Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan, was more important indicates that, 
in the U.S. government’s opinion, some of its most important interests in Afghanistan were 
realized, or that the U.S. policy goals had become exhausted and it was time for the U.S. 
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government move on to the next conflict. On the other hand, it could also be that the U.S. 
government realized that the Jihadist insurgency was regional, or even global in nature, and 
therefore the vast amount of expenditure in Afghanistan was no longer logical. That does not 
mean that the American efforts in Afghanistan are completed, but the security aspect, 
stabilising the state in such an extent that allows American withdrawal, must have been 
fulfilled in the view of the Obama Administration. The stabilisation of Afghanistan is also 
connected to the realization of building the Afghan state on democratic principles, and the 
ability to provide American citizens with physical security. The correction of past mistakes is 
still an interest that has not been fulfilled, as that will take many years and a lot of funding, 
but I will argue that if the U.S. government are willing to turn their aid projects towards 
nation-building again, it could possibly lead to a long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan with 
reasonable prospects of further development.  
 
3.5 Reflections on American foreign policy traditions in 
relation to policy towards Afghanistan and the results of 
the quantitative analysis 
Analysing the relation between foreign policy traditions and the U.S. policy goals in 
Afghanistan, plus the results of the quantitative analysis, makes it possible to give an opinion 
on what foreign policy tradition the Bush and Obama Administration followed during the 
years 2007-2012. The intention is to set the policy goals and the actual implementation of the 
policy (observations in chapter 2) in an American political context, as this is an interesting 
measurement of the two administrations’ bonds to tradition, which is a strong trait in the 
American creed. The intention is also to be able to conclude if the American foreign policy 
goals in Afghanistan follow foreign policy traditions in order to compare it to the 
observations made in chapter 2, and see if policy is consistent with the execution of aid 
projects. Another interesting point is whether or not the Bush and Obama Administration 
seem to follow the same foreign policy tradition. 
 First of all, as discussed in part 1.8, it is possible to divide the American foreign 
policy tradition into two periods, the “Old Testament” and the “New Testament,” whereby 
the New Testament approach “’… define[s] America as a Crusader State called to bring the 
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salvation to a world ravaged by revolution and wars.’”123 In relation to the U.S. intervention 
in Afghanistan this is relatable, but there were other considerations that initially initiated the 
intervention, first and foremost the security of American citizens, manifested as the war 
against terrorism. But, when U.S. intervention was implemented it is also possible to draw 
lines to the Crusader State, because there was also an intention to re-build Afghanistan as a 
democratic state, thereby being somewhat of a salvation for the Afghan people. As I also 
argued in part 1.8, American expansionism is related to the New Testament approach and 
could have influenced American foreign policy significantly. Spreading American 
democratic values to Afghanistan became a definitive aspect of the intervention, at least to 
give the Afghan society an opportunity to re-build the Afghan state as a free democratic state, 
after ridding it of the Taliban regime. The issue with this is that it was not the initially 
intended policy goal, nor was the implementation of nation-building work something the 
Bush Administration wanted. It was a consequence of not being able to fulfil the goal of 
defeating Al-Qaeda and entirely ridding Afghanistan of terrorist organisations. If it could be 
viewed as part of the New Testament it was incidental and not deliberate. 
 Mead’s four foreign policy traditions are more applicable than the Old and New 
Testament approach to this discussion, because his description of their traits are more 
specific. The attack on the U.S. (9/11) was ascribed to Al-Qaeda whereby the U.S. 
government demanded Al-Qaeda leaders extradited by the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan. The Taliban government refused to do this, which lead to the attack on 
Afghanistan. The initial intervention in Afghanistan must be said to follow the Jacksonian 
tradition as the goal of the intervention was to defeat Al-Qaeda, removing the possibility of 
more attacks on American citizens at home, thereby providing and enhancing the physical 
security of the American people, which is an important trait of Jacksonianism. The 
intervention also led to the dismantling of the Taliban government, which was a link to 
dismantling all terrorist activity in Afghanistan. Although it should not be achieved by 
provoking foreign states, the terrorists made the initial attack, and according to Mead, there is 
no option for governments following the Jacksonian tradition to loose, or to stay passive, 
when there are American interests to defend. The other major trait of Jacksonianism is the 
economic well being of Americans, but this trait does not correlate with the policy to 
intervene and initiate a large scale American military operation in Afghanistan, as this is 
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costly and may deprive the American society of governmental funds, which could potentially 
be put to good use at home. This aspect will be discussed further at a later point. 
 After the initial U.S. intervention, it is valid to argue that the policy goals in 
Afghanistan in some ways evolved along the lines of Wilsonianism, because spreading 
American democratic and social values became part of the policy goals (at least for the years 
being researched). On the other hand, the armed conflict was on going during the years 2007-
2012 so a continuation of Jacksonianism is arguably also correct. In other words, there are 
arguments for influence from both the Jacksonian and the Wilsonian tradition during the 
years researched. Obama’s decision to increase troops, in order to break the insurgents 
momentum, is in my opinion following the Jacksonian tradition as the major point to initiate 
the intervention was to defeat Al-Qaeda in order to prevent future terrorist attacks, and 
Obama’s decision was a continuation of this goal. On the other hand, The Bush 
Administration’s goal in 2008 was still to defeat the insurgency, and to re-build Afghanistan 
according to democratic principles. This is twofold in relation to the foreign policy traditions 
as the first part about defeating the insurgency falls under Jacksonianism, which is also the 
case for Obama’s decision to increase troops, while the part on re-building Afghanistan 
according to democratic principles is closer to Wilsonianism. The reason being that 
Wilsonianism is based on a belief that “… the United States has both a moral obligation and 
an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values.”124 This is 
exactly what Boucher pointed to in 2008, meaning that there are traces of both Jacksonianism 
and Wilsonianism in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in 2008. Furthermore, 
Clinton’s emphasis on expansion of civilian support in 2011 can arguably be said to fall 
under the Wilsonian tradition, as civilian support in this context is related to giving the 
Afghan citizens a stake in their own future, which according to U.S. foreign policy goals, was 
to build an Afghan state built on democratic principles.  	   As has been presented, there are traces of both Jacksonian and Wilsonian traits in the 
U.S. foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, in which the major goal was to provide physical 
security for American citizens. This goal was the initial reasoning for the intervention, and 
later continued by the policy goals of preventing a terrorist safe haven. In that sense, the goal 
of creating an Afghan state, built on democratic principles, must be viewed as a foreign 
policy tactic and not a goal. If one is to assume it was also a goal to create an Afghan state 
built on democratic principles, the U.S. foreign policy towards Afghanistan is a blend of the 	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two foreign policy traditions: Initially it is a Jacksonian intervention, but with the justification 
of spreading peace and democracy (added after the shift towards nation-building work), 
which falls under Wilsonianism. The stabilising of Afghanistan would contribute to a 
peaceful international community, but that can also be viewed as a strategy for the goal of 
providing American citizens with physical security. Therefore, it is arguable that the U.S. 
foreign policy in largest extent follows the Jacksonian tradition, because of the major goal to 
provide physical security for American citizens. Considering the intertwining of the foreign 
policy traditions, and the difficulty to attribute only Jacksonianism or Wilsonianism to U.S. 
foreign policy goals in Afghanistan, is it an option to propose a difference in the foreign 
policy strategy in relation to former strategies, such as the Truman Doctrine? 
 If one is to assume that the American intervention and aid efforts in Afghanistan had 
both the goal of providing physical security for American citizens, as well as a goal of 
spreading American democratic and social values, then it is not possible to explicitly attribute 
just one of the foreign policy traditions discussed to the U.S. foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan. This can be set in relation to the Truman Doctrine, as the Truman Doctrine must 
have been said to be the source of armed conflicts where the U.S. was involved, such as the 
Korean War and the Vietnam War.125 Although the Truman Doctrine was the source of U.S. 
involvement in these armed conflicts, I argue that the content of the Truman’s address to the 
Congress (cited in part 1.4) does open for use of military forces, but that the main focus was 
on economic aid: “I believe that help should be primarily through economic and financial aid 
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”126 In that sense the 
Truman Doctrine is essentially based on Wilsonian traits, whereas in worst-case scenarios it 
is a possibility to lean towards the traits of Jacksonianism in order to protect American values 
and American citizens. In my opinion this differs from the Bush Doctrine127 as the Bush 
Doctrine valued pre-emptive strikes and actively implemented interventions in order to attain 
the goal of spreading democracy. Although the Bush Administration’s policy evolved 
towards a nation-building effort in Afghanistan, the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were both essentially a consequence of the attack on the U.S. in 2001, where the initial goal 
was to fight terrorism in order to protect American citizens’ safety, as well as providing 
international security and stability. Therefore, the Bush Doctrine and the Bush 	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Administration’s actions in Afghanistan were largely based on Jacksonian traits, where the 
Wilsonian traits followed after a significant military operation. In light of this, I argue that the 
Bush Doctrine differs from the Truman Doctrine, in the sense that the Bush Doctrine 
presupposes that the goal of security possibly could be achieved by provoking foreign states, 
but that the relationship to foreign states should be taken into consideration, because of the 
goal of providing domestic security for U.S. citizens. This differs from the typical Jacksonian 
approach, because the Jacksonian approach is to avoid provocation of foreign states until it is 
not possible to avoid the provocation any more. The Bush Doctrine does not set these 
limitations because, ultimately, it is the safety of American citizens that is important. The 
secondary goal of the Bush Doctrine is to provide security for American citizens, by 
spreading American democratic and social values in order to stabilise the state or region the 
U.S. government has intervened in, in order to create a more peaceful international society. 
This presupposes a belief that the Western democratic model is the ideal model for creating 
stability. 
 The American foreign policy tradition indicates that among Mead’s four traditions, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the policy towards Afghanistan follows the Jacksonian 
tradition, but with the possibility of claiming that it also follows some traits of the Wilsonian 
tradition. The results of the quantitative analysis is also necessary to discuss in relation to 
foreign policy traditions, because - proven in the discussion on American foreign policy and 
the connection to nation- and state-building typologies - there is discordance between the 
policy and the actual aid efforts. The observations made in the quantitative analysis first and 
foremost indicate a connection to Wilsonianism, because of the nature of nation-building, 
being the overall most prioritized typology. It focuses on building a stable society and a state 
that can develop and thrive in the future, focusing on mitigating conflict and providing the 
citizens a say in national matters. However, state-building gradually became the most 
prioritized typology, and state-building is more related to Jacksonianism. The being that there 
is a larger focus on coercion, but also because it seems to be a consequence of the withdrawal 
of American troops. Withdrawing American troops will, in a small scale, provide safety for 
those American citizens deployed in Afghanistan, but more importantly because the 
expenditure on American military efforts in Afghanistan deprives the U.S. government of 
funds that are needed to create economic well being for American citizens at home. U.S. 
domestic economic issues does not support continued military spending in Afghanistan. 
Therefore it is reasonable to argue that the American efforts in Afghanistan have not resulted 
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in any economic advantages that are significant enough to defend the continued military 
spending there. It can also be seen as a strategic move. 
 An interesting observation on this is how it in some ways can be related to the 
Jeffersonian tradition, as this tradition (according to Mead) focuses on low cost and low level 
of danger in order to protect American values, by protecting American values in the domestic 
territory. Mead has, in answers to critique of his definition of Jeffersonianism, pointed out 
that, what he calls high Jeffersonians, were for containment in accordance with 
Jeffersonianism, but after World War II saw the need for the U.S. to enter into the role of the 
central international power as an “unwelcome and dangerous but necessary task.”128 This 
underlines Mead’s definition of how Jeffersonianism focus on a low level of danger in 
particular, but some international involvement may be necessary in order to keep the 
international society stable. At the same time the, U.S. government has proclaimed not to 
repeat the mistakes of the past, and that it will continue aiding Afghanistan in the future, 
although not as much with security, which is still a transnational effort, and that is more 
related to Jacksonianism than Jeffersonianism. The results of the quantitative analysis in 
relation to American foreign policy traditions therefore resemble those of the foreign policy 
towards Afghanistan. 
 The conclusion on the relation between American foreign policy traditions and the 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan for the years 2007-2012, as well as the results of the 
quantitative analysis, must be that Jacksonianism seems to be the tradition that has the 
tightest connection to both the foreign policy, and the results of the quantitative analysis, but 
that there are some aspects of Wilsonianism which seem to influence both those aspects as 
well. The traces of Wilsonianism may be strategic measures taken in order to fulfil 
Jacksonian goals, but if the traces of Wilsonianism are also specific goals, they are 
conflicting with Jacksonianism. This indicates that the Bush Doctrine has potential to shape 
U.S. foreign policy in the future. It is important to remember that traditions cannot command 
the same level of influence, and therefore it is not possible to claim that the foreign policy 
and observations in chapter 2 have equal traces of both Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the connection between American foreign aid to 
Afghanistan, American foreign policy traditions, American foreign policy goals in 
Afghanistan, and U.S. self-interest. The reason for doing this was to analyse the connections 
between these different aspects of American foreign policy to be able to discuss if there is 
correlation between foreign policy and aid projects, and to identify which American self-
interests have influenced foreign aid in general, using the case of Afghanistan. The thesis is 
complex because of the many variables, and it was necessary to tie these aspects together to 
give a complete picture of the foreign policy in which aid strategies have been embedded. 
 American foreign aid to Afghanistan was a consequence of the intervention in 2001, 
although the Bush Administration did not initially intend to involve itself in long-term aid 
work. The small footprint strategy quickly revealed that it was not possible to achieve the 
wanted results without doing developmental work. Afghanistan proved to be a state and area 
of several conflicting identities, and after Al-Qaeda and Taliban was driven back to such a 
degree that it was possible to implement governmental and social reforms, the Bush 
Administration changed their strategy. The U.S. efforts in Afghanistan entered in a nation-
building effort where the goal was to build a new society based on American ideals, 
specifically democratic principles. The Obama Administration focused their goals in 
Afghanistan, while continuing the nation-building effort, but as President Obama announced 
his plan for the withdrawal of American troops, the aid evolved into a state-building effort. 
The Obama Administration’s new focus was mainly to prevent a terrorist safe haven, but in 
addition it was not to repeat mistakes of the past and leave Afghanistan to cope for itself. 
Hillary Clinton declared that involving the civilian society was a necessity for the 
development of a democratic state and to improve the rights of vulnerable groups, such as 
women.   
 Although the efforts were made in Afghanistan, Senate hearings revealed an increased 
focus on Pakistan and bilateral relations with Pakistan. As stated earlier, this does not mean 
that the purpose of the intervention in Afghanistan was to increase incentive for an expansion 
of the bilateral relation with Pakistan, but as the U.S. was already involved in Afghanistan, 
and the reasons for intervening in the first place (dismantling extreme Islamist (terror) 
organisations) moved into Pakistan, it forced an increasing pressure on the Obama 
Administration to engage with Pakistani authorities. Thus, American interests area of focus 
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shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan, but not necessarily the content of the interests. The 
shifting focus maintained the interest of American citizens’ security because the focus was 
mainly on a continued dismantling of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
 The empirical evidence in chapter 2 (the quantitative analysis) provides some 
important observations and answers to questions regarding different aspects of the American 
foreign aid effort in Afghanistan, for the years 2007-2012. First of all, the total distribution of 
aid displays that the funding for aid in Afghanistan increased significantly from 2007 to 
2009, where it stabilised for the remaining years researched. This proves that there was an 
increased priority of aid-work in Afghanistan. Upon closer observation, the difference in 
spending for the larger projects also changed, but only in the sense that some projects seemed 
to have been finished, moving the money to another large project. The project size did not 
seem to indicate any difference of importance for some of the projects, but rather that some 
of the projects were more costly to implement. At the same time, the analysis reveals that the 
smaller the project, the greater the probability was that they were society-building projects. 
Because of this it is also reasonable, and provable, that there were a significant larger amount 
of society-building projects than nation- and state-building projects. Finally, the distribution 
across the typology of aid strategies, noted and discussed in this thesis, revealed that the 
American aid efforts in Afghanistan were, although unevenly, spread out on the three 
typologies, confirming H4, the hypothesis that the U.S. aid efforts in Afghanistan were 
related to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. Although H4 was confirmed, 
the distribution per typology also revealed a shift in priority, in which nation-building 
projects had the highest priority until 2011, when state-building projects where most 
prioritized, and spending on nation- and society-building projects plummeted. 
 The shift of American interests, and their focus on another area, is visible in the aid 
during the researched years. The priority of nation-building projects in 2007 through 2011 
changed significantly in 2012 where the main priority was state-building projects. With 
regard to the aspects of the different typologies, this meant a decreased focus on long-term 
stability and development, moving the aid efforts towards a short-term commitment, as well 
as possibly creating an environment for short-term stability. One can argue that the shift 
towards state-building, being a less costly aid effort, could be a consequence of achieving a 
certain level of stability and development, in which the U.S. government were able to enter 
into a phase of less aid spending because the Afghan state was able to provide for itself in 
areas where it had not before. In other words, the U.S. aid efforts had given results that 
enabled a large short-term state-building effort before scaling down the aid program to a 
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more moderate size. Although this can be an argument for the shift in priorities of American 
foreign aid work, it is not necessarily a viable argument. I argue that the state of the 
development of Afghanistan had at that time, and also today, not reached a level that made it 
possible for the discontinuation of aid from the international community. Afghanistan is still 
ranked as one of the least developed states among all states recognized by the United 
Nations. In order for continued development, and a possibility for a Muslim state to be 
influenced by Western ideals and values, it is in my opinion imperative that the U.S. aid 
effort continues, especially considering the necessity to gain the Afghan people and 
government’s trust, considering the past. It will also serve the U.S. government’s promise to 
correct faults of history, which was presented as a foreign policy goal in 2009.  
 The more convincing argument on why there was a shift in priority towards state-
building efforts in 2012, is that because of the withdrawal of American troops was scheduled 
in December 2014, the Obama Administration saw no other option than rushing the 
development of the Afghan state, thereby concentrating on areas that fall under state-building 
criteria, because state-building can be a less time-consuming process than nation-building. 
Although it can be less time-consuming, the total amount of aid spent per year continued at 
the same level after the shift towards state-building, but because it is a process that can be 
completed faster, the spending will quickly decrease after the process is completed. As has 
been discussed, state-building does not correlate with the Obama Administration’s policy to 
focus on long-term stability, as states developed through state-building can de-stabilise and 
fall apart, or otherwise evolve into authoritarian regimes. Although authoritarian regimes may 
be stable over time, the foreign policy goal of the U.S. government evolved into a goal of 
building Afghanistan on democratic principles, which is not achievable while the regime is 
authoritarian. The possible outcome is that the progress made may return to the previous 
state, or at least worsen in some degree. Therefore, the long-term stability of a state built on 
democratic principles necessarily must be built by using nation-building, possibly in 
combination with society-building.  
 At the same time as the major priorities and the shifts in priority are related to nation- 
and state-building, the confirmed hypothesis is H4, meaning that the American government 
aid efforts in Afghanistan (2007-2012) were related to state-building, nation-building, and 
society-building. Thus, the American aid efforts in Afghanistan are not related to only one of 
the typologies when donating aid, even though there are some differences in priorities. The 
U.S. aid work in Afghanistan supports itself on several principles, such as: A focus on the 
civilians rights and abilities to have a say in Afghan state affairs, mitigation between tribal 
	  79	  
societies that can possibly end in a shared idea of an Afghan national identity, making the 
Afghan authorities capable of enforcing laws, and to develop a strong executive government, 
which is able to create policy that will push Afghanistan towards a more developed and stable 
state. According to the various aspects of the typologies, this may be a possible way of 
successfully achieving stability in Afghanistan, as it involves a broad spectrum approach to 
the development and stabilising of a failed state, including every aspect of the Afghan 
society, from individual civilians, to different groups in Afghanistan (tribal societies), all the 
way to the state and government.  
 American foreign policy, specifically Mead’s four traditions, are not all represented in 
the case of Afghanistan. As discussed in chapter 3, the decision to intervene followed the 
Jacksonian tradition, while there were traces of Wilsonianism in the following nation-
building efforts. The overall trend points toward a combination of these two foreign policy 
traditions, manifested in the Bush Doctrine, which in my opinion differs somewhat from the 
Truman Doctrine. It is an interesting idea because the U.S. intervention and aid effort in 
Afghanistan are so tightly connected, and because there are traces of both Jacksonianism and 
Wilsonianism. The approach of the Bush Doctrine is not a passive approach to foreign 
relations, because the most important point is to protect American interests and citizens. In 
order to do that, it may be necessary to launch a military operation abroad. This has also been 
done before, and after, the intervention in Afghanistan, but the interesting aspect of the 
Afghanistan case is that it resulted in a long-term military operation, but more importantly, a 
long-term aid effort. This can also be seen as connected with the historical American 
relationship with Afghanistan, as a pronounced foreign policy goal was not to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. The goal of building Afghanistan anew on democratic principles falls 
under the Wilsonian tradition, but it is also part of the Jacksonian tradition, because of the 
aspect of intervention and armed conflict. These traditions cannot control an equal amount of 
influence, so it may be that the traces of Wilsonianism only serves subordinate of 
Jacksonianism, but as discussed in chapter 3 they are interconnected in so many ways that the 
approach of the Bush Doctrine may prove to have formed a new foreign policy strategy, 
which may be applied in several similar cases in the future. This is especially true when 
dealing with states such as Afghanistan, meaning failed states outside developed regions built 
on the current Western state model. It is not necessarily a successful strategy, which can only 
be concluded with future research, and it is not exactly an approach that stands in opposition 
to the Truman Doctrine, but the willingness to intervene on the basis of protecting the 
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security of American citizens before entering into a long-term development aid commitment, 
is in some ways a new approach. 
 American self-interest in Afghanistan has been represented in several ways. The 
strategic location is of vital significance, and so is the spreading of American ideals. The 
stabilisation of the region could potentially rid the U.S. government of potential terrorist 
threats, but the threat moved to other states, such as Pakistan, which is possibly related to the 
realization of the U.S. government that the problem of terrorism is a regional, or even a 
global, issue. I am not sure if American presence in Central Asia has increased security for 
American citizens, or other Western states for that matter, but it has brought Al-Qaeda to its 
knees, and removed their opportunity to use Afghanistan as a safe haven where they were 
able to train individuals to perform well-planned attacks in the U.S. and other Western states. 
The U.S. has, so far, also been able to rectify their previous efforts in Afghanistan by keeping 
their promise of aiding Afghanistan into development in the future. This will take time, and I 
am not sure if the U.S. government are able to defend the continued level of spending in 
Afghanistan, particularly when the domestic economy in the U.S. is in such a bad shape. The 
aspect of economic interests, rather surprisingly, does not seem to have an influence on the 
American efforts in Afghanistan. It may develop into a state with a thriving economy, and 
become a potential trade partner for the U.S., but as of now the U.S. has done little else than 
spend money in Afghanistan.  
 American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan (2007-2012), and the relation to 
American foreign policy traditions were at various points conflicting. The shifting focus from 
security to nation-building, and back to security again, seem to have shaped the aid efforts in 
Afghanistan. The Bush Administration unwillingly and unintentionally entered into a nation-
building effort, whereas the Obama Administration, when taking charge of the foreign policy, 
eventually shifted focus towards security again. This has been proven in the quantitative 
analysis, where the empirical evidence portrays an increased focus on state-building efforts in 
2012. As I have argued, this can be seen as a consequence of the deteriorating security 
situation where President Obama increased the military presence in Afghanistan in order to 
break the insurgents momentum. This was conflicting with Clinton’s statement on how the 
Obama Administration focused on long-term stability because the increased military presence 
served as a prelude for the retraction of American troops, which arguably could lead to a new 
period of deteriorating security in Afghanistan. These contradictory policy goals also led to 
conflicting and contradictory use of Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. The Jacksonian trait of 
providing security for American citizens was always a large part of the analysed American 
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efforts in Afghanistan, but the Wilsonian trait of spreading American values stood out as an 
important argument for U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. Because of these conflicting 
interests and policy goals it is understandable that the American aid work shifted from one 
typology to another.  
 Although the empirical evidence does not correlate with all of the policy goals and 
traits of the foreign policy traditions that were present, there is correlation with the process. 
The increased focus on nation-building in American foreign policy manifested itself in the 
empirical evidence as a large increase in society- and especially nation-building spending. 
When President Obama informed (in 2009) that he was sending more troops to Afghanistan, 
the nation-building spending continued at a high level, but it started to decrease in 2011 and 
plummeted in 2012, where state-building spending increased significantly. As I have argued 
the nation- and society-building spending can be viewed as a balancing force against the 
state-building efforts, in which the military efforts also are part of the equation. Thus, the 
state-building work became unbalanced towards the end of the years analysed. 
 The results of this thesis have shown that there are several American interests in 
Afghanistan, and that they are connected to at least two American foreign policy traditions. 
No American interests seem to have been of an economic nature during the years that have 
been researched. Although that seemed to be the case in 2012, the future of American 
bilateral relations with Afghanistan is uncertain and may evolve into a beneficial relationship 
for both states, but that must be a suggestion for future research projects. The quantitative 
analysis confirmed hypothesis H4, meaning that the U.S. foreign aid efforts in Afghanistan 
relates to state-building, nation-building, and society-building. Although the priority of the 
different typologies proved to shift, the overall aid effort for the years 2007-2012 combined 
the traits of the three typologies, which seems to be a reasonable strategy; developing a failed 
state is a complex process and it is not unreasonable to expect that it is necessary to tackle the 
different issues from several angles. American foreign policy goals in Afghanistan shifted 
during the years researched, mostly in accordance with the observed aid effort, but the focus 
on long-term stability combined with the building of Afghanistan on democratic principles 
does not correlate with the increased priority of state-building projects in 2012. The 
difference in priority of the typologies also revealed a difference in the use of American 
foreign policy traditions. It seems that the Bush Doctrine may have provided a new strategy 
for American foreign relations, particularly in relation to foreign aid work. Thus, American 
foreign aid work and foreign policy goals seem to be a conflicted process with ever-changing 
interests and strategies. 
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Suggestions for future research 
This thesis has provided some empirical evidence, which when set into context of American 
foreign policy and foreign policy traditions, has revealed some interesting observations that 
may be relevant for future research. My first suggestion for future research is a replication of 
the quantitative analysis to see if the results are the same. It may also be possible to review 
the parameters set for this thesis in order to check the presented results in this thesis. 
Furthermore, it is possible to expand the quantitative analysis, as data for other years are 
published, in order to see if the U.S. continues the level of aid spending in Afghanistan, or if 
it increases or decreases. An expansion of the quantitative analysis would also enable an 
observation of the typologies, and whether the priority of them differs, or stay the same. 
Finally, it is possible to do a similar quantitative analysis of U.S. involvement in other 
countries to compare it with the efforts in Afghanistan, or even a comparison of previous 
efforts in Afghanistan and the commitments this thesis has analysed. This could provide a 
comparative analysis of aid spending, and the priority of the different typologies, but also a 
comparison of what foreign policy traditions different presidential administrations has 
followed. 
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Appendix  	  
State-building projects (million USD) 
Recipient 
country 
Project title Total (2007-
2012) 
Afghanistan Public Sector Executive Function 1734,70073 
Afghanistan International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Country Program 1418,6363 
Afghanistan In-Country Counternarcotics Program 706,758 
Afghanistan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): Special Overseas Contingency Operations funding 
authority to support TFBSO Programs 
203,25661 
Afghanistan International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Anti-Crime Programs 177,21613 
Afghanistan Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): Support Funds 148,04131 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Rule of Law and Governance 48,85348 
Afghanistan Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform - Operational Support 24,58852 
Afghanistan Small Arms Light Weapons 15,7234 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Rule of Law and Governance 13,1986 
Afghanistan International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Demand Reduction 11,18624 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Protective Measures 10,50714 
Afghanistan Conventional Weapons Destruction 4,33333 
Afghanistan Protection and Solutions 4,19137 
Afghanistan Program Support (Narcotics) 3,65178 
Afghanistan US Marshals Service: Operation Enduring Freedom 3,59611 
Afghanistan U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund 
3,47332 
Afghanistan Global Threat Reduction (GTR) 3,33891 
Afghanistan Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance 3,30391 
Afghanistan Program Support (Governance) 2,51489 
Afghanistan U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Export Control and Related 
Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
2,21021 
Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Reforms 1,35293 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Economic Crimes. 0,8618 
Afghanistan Small Arms and Light Weapons 0,6 
Afghanistan Program Support (Rule of Law) 0,44938 
Afghanistan Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Basic Course 0,29682 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Financial Crimes Law Enforcement. 0,2954 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Economic Crimes 0,15839 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: Aghan LEEDS 0,12 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Crime Scene / Basic Evidence Response Course 0,113 
Afghanistan Department of Justice: Training 0,10452 
Afghanistan International Narcotics & Law Enforcement: Unspecified (Supplemental) 0,06469 
Afghanistan Department of Justice: Assessment 0,05927 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - LETSS 0,058 
Afghanistan Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Advanced Wireroom Analyst Course 0,04916 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Internal Controls / Public Corruption Course 0,04 
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Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: Afghanistan Training Initiative (ATI) - Interview and Interrogation 
Course 
0,035 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Kidnapping Investigations Course 0,035 
Afghanistan International Air Cargo Interdicition Training 0,03483 
Afghanistan Border Enforcement Exchange 0,02462 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Basic Intelligence Analysis Course 0,0237 
Afghanistan Drug Enforcement Administration: Drug Enforcement Training 0,01885 
Afghanistan Strengthening Local Staff and Community Capacity to Respond to and Prevent Gender Based 
Violence among Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
0,0157 
Afghanistan International Border Interdiction Training 0,0145 
Afghanistan Program Support (Protection) 0,01195 
Afghanistan Border Management Task Force (BMTF). 0,01132 
Afghanistan Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Advanced Practical Application Course 0,01117 
Afghanistan Federal Bureau of Investigation: ATI - Organized Crime Course 0,00852 
Afghanistan Defense Threat Reduction (DOD) 0,00834 
Afghanistan U.S. Department of State: Nonproliferation Assistance Programs - Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 
0,00424 
Afghanistan Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: Firearm Trace 0,00172 
Total  4548,16311 
 
 
Nation-building projects (million USD) 
Recipient 
country 
Project title Total (2007-
2012) 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation 849,09953 
Afghanistan Transport Services 821,66725 
Afghanistan Modern Energy Services 697,45275 
Afghanistan Economic Growth and Development 694,99133 
Afghanistan Conflict Mitigation 493,64397 
Afghanistan Elections and Political Processes 296,05612 
Afghanistan Basic Education 230,38143 
Afghanistan Economic Support Fund 180,05347 
Afghanistan Social Services 171,08116 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation 167,8201 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Education 147,41896 
Afghanistan Social Assistance 124,27966 
Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Processes 116,22022 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Other Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Projects 
108,9412 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Kandahar City 
Bridging Solution 
101,46634 
Afghanistan Private Sector Productivity 87,88018 
Afghanistan Higher Education 79,52933 
Afghanistan Rehabilitate Afghanistan as a Nation-State 59,84528 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Education 58,2072 
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Afghanistan Inclusive Financial Markets 55,99247 
Afghanistan Justice System 51,82367 
Afghanistan Democracy and Governance 50,49554 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation 48,95852 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity 42,4101 
Afghanistan Water Supply and Sanitation 41,67819 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation 33,94713 
Afghanistan Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I Program 33,87172 
Afghanistan Media Freedom and Freedom of Information 32,28649 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity 31,50853 
Afghanistan Legislative Function and Processes 31,40164 
Afghanistan Financial Services 29,91966 
Afghanistan Natural Resources and Biodiversity 28,76219 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation 
Purchase Program 
24,30022 
Afghanistan Constitutions, Laws, and Legal Systems 23,71015 
Afghanistan Workforce Development 22,17508 
Afghanistan Fiscal policy 19,75389 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Economic, Financial, and Management 
Improvements 
17,56917 
Afghanistan Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-East - Conflict Mitigation 15,87334 
Afghanistan Program Support (Conflict) 14,14887 
Afghanistan Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) Project - Business Enabling Environment 13,96145 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I Program 13,35803 
Afghanistan Create Conditions for Stability 12,37651 
Afghanistan Capacity Building and Change Management Program 12,20054 
Afghanistan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Task Order Five) under the Agency’s Water IQC 
II, Integrated Water and Coastal Resources Management Indefinite Quantity Contract II (i.e., 
Water IQC II) 
10,749 
Afghanistan Support for the American University of Afghanistan 10,39817 
Afghanistan USAID - CONST OF 68 KM SECTION OF SPIN BOLDAK TO BIKAH ROAD 10,18904 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Route Bear 
Road/Shah Wali Kot Ford 
9,78996 
Afghanistan Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support (EQUALS) Program - Modern Energy 
Services 
8,39509 
Afghanistan Judicial Independence 8,3338 
Afghanistan Re-establish Food Security 8,25907 
Afghanistan Development Assistance - Development Assistance 8,23051 
Afghanistan Tech. Assist/Training 8,11288 
Afghanistan Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation Purchase 
Program 
8,07315 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Spin Boldak Road 
Phase II & III 
7,97463 
Afghanistan Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-West - Conflict Mitigation 6,75277 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Irrigation 6,68135 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Telecommunications 6,66572 
Afghanistan Higher Education Program 3 (HEP-3) 6,07188 
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Afghanistan Financial Sector Enabling Environment 5,96859 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) - Peace and Reconciliation Processes 5,4383 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) - Media Freedom and 
Freedom of Information 
5,35236 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Electricity - FY10 Southern Electrical 
Power System - Starter Kit 
5,04049 
Afghanistan Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education (BELT) 4,68873 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) - Conflict Mitigation 4,22679 
Afghanistan Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-South - Peace and Reconciliation Processes 3,98669 
Afghanistan Community Based Stability Grants (CBSGs) - Peace and Reconciliation Processes 3,81362 
Afghanistan Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-North - Conflict Mitigation 3,50623 
Afghanistan Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA) 3,38368 
Afghanistan Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) 3,17896 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Arghistan Bridge 
Bypass 
3,10899 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Telecommunications 3,0674 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY11 Lashkar Gah to 
Nawa Road 
2,732 
Afghanistan Program Support (Infrastructure) 2,40543 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of Food Aid under Food For Education Program 2,02505 
Afghanistan Freight Cost of Food Aid under Food For Education Program 1,84943 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Budget and Fiscal Accountability 1,52842 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Budget and Financial Accountability 1,40081 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Transportation - FY10 Tarnak Bridge 
Bypass 
1,08433 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) - Justice System 1 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Economic Crimes 0,81201 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Financial Institutions Policy and Regulation. 0,76659 
Afghanistan Stability In Key Areas (SIKA)-North - Peace and Reconciliation Processes 0,74329 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Revenue Policy and Administration 0,73411 
Afghanistan Building the Capacity of the Ministry to Increase Knowledge of the Labor Code and Basic Worker 
Rights. 
0,65 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Budget and Financial Accountability. 0,64046 
Afghanistan Decent Work Country Program - Cooperative Agreement with the International Labor Organization 0,6 
Afghanistan Communications Services 0,5 
Afghanistan Building the Capacity of the Labor Ministry to Increase Knowledge of the Labor Code and Basic 
Worker Rights. 
0,5 
Afghanistan Infrastructure 0,44932 
Afghanistan REHABILITATE AFGHANISTAN AS A NATION-STATE 0,43485 
Afghanistan e-Afghan Ag 0,41506 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Revenue Policy and Administration. 0,38226 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Tax Policy and Administration 0,37465 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Government Debt Issuance and Management. 0,31488 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Government Debt Issuance and Management 0,29885 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to People's Radio 0,2851 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Banking and Financial Services. 0,24595 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Media Resource Center 0,2357 
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Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Water and Sanitation - FY10 Kanhahar 
City Water Master Plan 
0,15341 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Operations 0,10478 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to American Abroad Media 0,089 
Afghanistan Faculty Exchange Program 0,07 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to SABA Media Organization 0,06 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Financial Institutions Policy And Regulations. 0,05442 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Bureau for Reconstruction and Development 0,0488 
Afghanistan Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC) GIS Training 0,04509 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Bureau for Reconstruction and Development for 
Accountability. 
0,042 
Afghanistan Livestock Extension (6) 0,042 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Banking and Financial Services 0,03511 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Media Resource Center for Freedom of 
Information. 
0,035 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Badghis Social Journalism Association 0,0285 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for OTA Operations 0,0282 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Government Debt Issuance and Management 0,02329 
Afghanistan Rehabilitate Afghanistan as a Nation-State - International Narcotics Control 0,01307 
Afghanistan Education and Water Programs 0,01197 
Afghanistan Training Course 0,0045 
Afghanistan Workshop 0,0045 
Afghanistan Poultry Farm 0,003 
Afghanistan Technical Assistance for Banking and Financial Services 0,002 
Afghanistan Office Of Social Sector Dev. - Education 0,00009 
Afghanistan REESTABLISH FOOD SECURITY 0 
Total   6392,26371 
 
 
Society-building projects (million USD) 
Recipient 
country 
Project title Total (2007-
2012) 
Afghanistan Local Government and Decentralization 409,68321 
Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Productivity 350,21656 
Afghanistan Maternal and Child Health 258,83083 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency 158,5844 
Afghanistan Crisis Assistance and Recovery 153,43255 
Afghanistan Improved Access to Education and Health Services 134,18813 
Afghanistan Family Planning and Reproductive Health 113,91842 
Afghanistan Interdiction 99,99966 
Afghanistan Agricultural Enabling Environment 74,87198 
Afghanistan Strengthen Microenterprise Productivity 52,95446 
Afghanistan Civic Participation 52,82499 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency 49,9444 
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Afghanistan Partnership Contracts for Health Services (PCH) Program - On Budget 34,09546 
Afghanistan Section 202e Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Section 202e: Section of USAID's P.L. 480 
authorizing funds to support Title II activities 
31,8852 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Direct Support Cost 31,5217 
Afghanistan Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Emergency 25,4575 
Afghanistan Commodity cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Emergency 24,0652 
Afghanistan Better Education & Healthier Population 22,55783 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Direct Support Cost 21,5199 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency 19,8038 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid 18,5496 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency 17,9732 
Afghanistan Human Rights 17,38337 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Direct Costs 14,2663 
Afghanistan Commodity Value for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 14,1227 
Afghanistan Tuberculosis 13,09442 
Afghanistan Partnership Contract for Health Services (PCH) program 11,95759 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons 10,83 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Emergency 10,7179 
Afghanistan Health Services Support Project (HSSP) 10,6701 
Afghanistan Other Public Health Threats 9,30836 
Afghanistan Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Direct Support Cost 7,969 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid 7,8615 
Afghanistan Learning for Community Empowerment Program 2 (LCEP-2) 7,07051 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Regular 5,7697 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV 5,3316 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV 4,8528 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for 4,206 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning 4,05 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV 3,7633 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV 3,6156 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for In-Direct Support Cost 3,2991 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 3,2739 
Afghanistan ITSH Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 3,1806 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid 3,07 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons 3,04 
Afghanistan Implementation of the Small Grants Program for Afghan Womens Civil Society - Local Government 
and Decentralization 
2,98135 
Afghanistan OFDA/Disaster Response 2,74268 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Regular 2,6542 
Afghanistan Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II) 2,58491 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work 2,3703 
Afghanistan Program Support (Agriculture) 2,27094 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Other Direct Costs 2,2078 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid 2,168 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Indirect Support Cost 1,7373 
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Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV 1,6923 
Afghanistan Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for In-Direct Support Cost 1,6164 
Afghanistan Section 202e for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 1,5802 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons 1,47 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for 1,403 
Afghanistan Health Field Support 1,4 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Displaced Persons 1,2652 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid 1,2645 
Afghanistan Democracy & Govt.-Broad Citizen Participation 1,24471 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Sri Lank Prepositioning of Food Aid 1,2447 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Health/Nutrition, Direct Distribution - Non HIV 1,2348 
Afghanistan Program Support (Private Sector) 1,12968 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for 1,1156 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Cost for Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust 1,0381 
Afghanistan HIV/AIDS - Assistance for HIV/AIDS 1 
Afghanistan Freight cost of USAID Title II Emergency Food Aid for Other Direct Costs 0,8879 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning 0,6741 
Afghanistan Assistance for HIV/AIDS 0,66121 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Maternal Child Health - Non HIV 0,635 
Afghanistan Tuberculosis C.A.R.E. - Tuberculosis 0,6 
Afghanistan HIV/AIDS 0,58879 
Afghanistan Child Survival and Health Grants Program (CSHGP) 0,53792 
Afghanistan Program Support (Civil Society) 0,51816 
Afghanistan Program Design and Learning (Agriculture) 0,49372 
Afghanistan Improved social, economic, and/or developmental status of targeted vulnerable populations 0,43541 
Afghanistan Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development Program (AGRED) - Agricultural Sector 
Productivity 
0,41818 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,4114 
Afghanistan Trafficking-in-Persons and Migrant Smuggling 0,385 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,3544 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,307 
Afghanistan ITSH Freight Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning 0,2503 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,2373 
Afghanistan Avian Influenza 0,21938 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,2121 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Djibouti Prepositioning 0,1504 
Afghanistan Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations 0,09891 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work 0,0883 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0771 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV 0,0611 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV 0,0565 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0468 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0407 
Afghanistan OFDA/Disaster Response - Avian Flu 0,0376 
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Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct 
Distribution - Non HIV 
0,0291 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work 0,0291 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work - Non HIV 0,0273 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Jacinto Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0268 
Afghanistan Commodity Cost of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct 
Distribution - Non HIV 
0,0235 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Food For Work 0,0231 
Afghanistan Program Support (Disaster Readiness) 0,02131 
Afghanistan of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0185 
Afghanistan Inland Freight Co of USAID Title II Food Aid for Lome Prepositioning of Food Aid 0,0106 
Afghanistan Ocean Freight of USAID Title II Food Aid for Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Direct 
Distribution - Non HIV 
0,0067 
Afghanistan Office of Social Sector Development - HEALTH 0,006 
Afghanistan Nutrition 0 
Afghanistan Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Agricultural 
Enabling Environment 
0 
Afghanistan Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Agricultural 
Sector Productivity 
0 
Afghanistan Addressing Short-Term Stabilization and Long-Term Development Objectives th - Natural 
Resources and Biodiversity 
0 
Afghanistan Alternative Development and Agriculture −0,01146 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation 63,40709 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Healthcare 52,46118 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 25,43927 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Civic Support Vehicles 8,95247 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Food Production and Distribution 3,5421 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture 2,50681 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation - FY10 Dahla Dam 
Feasibility Review, Watershed Study 
2,12063 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Civic Cleanup Activities 1,23018 
Afghanistan Humanitarian Mine Action 83,84625 
Afghanistan Initial Contribution to ICRC for its 2009 South Asia Emergency Appeal 41,846 
Afghanistan Emergency Refugee Assistance: Third Contribution to budget extension appeal for Afghanistan, 
including new and additional requirements for ICRC 
7,9 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for International Private Enterprise 5,58108 
Afghanistan Refugee Assistance Activities 4,02543 
Afghanistan Integrated Support to GOA 2,1638 
Afghanistan Victims Assistance 2 
Afghanistan Health and Social Resettlement Support to Returnees, Refugees, and Return affected Communities 
in Eastern Afghanistan. 
1,78768 
Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihood and Reintegration Program in Takhar Province 1,7876 
Afghanistan Recovery and Emergency Support Toward Afghan Returnee Transitions (RE-START) an integrated 
approach. 
1,7 
Afghanistan Supporting sustainable return to Kabul province 1,59894 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return To Kabul Province 1,59416 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return to Kabul Province 1,551 
Afghanistan Nangarhar And Laghman Health Program 1,4967 
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Afghanistan Nangarhar and Laghman Health Program 1,46656 
Afghanistan Prevention of and response to vulnerability amongst returnee in IDP women and girls in 
Afghanistan 
1,426 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for International Private Enterprise for 
Democratic Ideas and Values. 
1,37165 
Afghanistan Creating Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities for Returnees in Northern Afghanistan 1,2 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project 1,10396 
Afghanistan Integrated Shelter Assistance 1,06 
Afghanistan Mobile Demining Program 1,03333 
Afghanistan Integrated Return to Kabul 1,027 
Afghanistan Supporting Durable Return and Recovery in Paktya Province 1,02237 
Afghanistan Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan - Paktya 1 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Welfare Association for Development of Afghanistan 0,987 
Afghanistan Creating Sustainable livelihood opportunities for urban and sem-urban returnees communities in N. 
Afghanistan 
0,922 
Afghanistan Supporting Livelihood Security for Returnee Communities in Northern Afghanistan 0,898 
Afghanistan Kandahar, Kawzjan & Faryab Integrated And Sustainable Services For Returnees And Host 
Communities 
0,88789 
Afghanistan Health & Social Resettlement Support in Eastern Afghanistan 0,88582 
Afghanistan Refugee Reintegration Project 0,86989 
Afghanistan Kandahar Returnee Reintegration Program (KRRP) 0,86107 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through International Organisation for Migration] 0,8475 
Afghanistan Kandahar, Jawzjan and Faryab Integrated and sustainable services for returnees 0,83544 
Afghanistan Reintegration support to improve health, livelihoods, and prevention of Gender Based Violence for 
refugee - returnees to E. Afghanistan 
0,83173 
Afghanistan Afghan Refugees and Returnees in Baghlan & Kundug Takkar Provinces 0,80713 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return in Khaki Jabbar District 0,8 
Afghanistan NGO Project for Afghan Refugees and Returnees in Baglan, Kunduz, Takhar Provinces in 
Afghanistan 
0,78401 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project Basic Education, Health Promotion, and Leadership 
Development for Women 
0,74189 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Unspecified Project 0,73878 
Afghanistan Conservation of Qala Ikhtyaruddin, the 15th-century Citadel of Herat 0,725 
Afghanistan ASLI: Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihoods Initiative for Returned Refugees 0,71812 
Afghanistan Cottage Industry Cooperatives(CICs) for Returnees in Kunar and Nangahar: Building Value Chains 
from Households to Marketplace 
0,70494 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking [through Hagar USA Inc. ] 0,704 
Afghanistan Sustainable family improvement Project Basic Education Health Promotion and Life Skill Training 
and Business Development for Women 
0,69274 
Afghanistan Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities for Refugee Returnee and other socially-excluded 
Women in Afghanistan through Commercial Integrated Farming Initiatives in Parwan Nangarhar 
Provinces. 
0,68331 
Afghanistan Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan (ARRA) 0,66694 
Afghanistan Afghanistan's Neglected Boys: A Model of Care for Male Trafficking Victims 0,65 
Afghanistan Transitional Support To Improve Health Status And Ensure The Continuum Of Care For Refugees, 
Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan 
0,63465 
Afghanistan Jawzjan and Kandahar Integrated and Sustainable Services for Returnees and Host Communities 
Project 
0,62554 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections: Increasing Meaningful Participation of 
Women and Youth in Parliamentary and District Councils Elections 
0,591 
	  	  96	  
Afghanistan Empowering Refugee Returnee And Other Socially-Excluded Women In Afghanistan Thorugh 
Sustainable Agribusiness Opportunities And Reights-Based Activities In Parwan, Nahgarhar & 
Heart Provinces 
0,54185 
Afghanistan Hamsaya Project: Supporting Sustainable Refugee Return - Afghanistan 0,49133 
Afghanistan Prevention of and response to vulnerability amongst returnee and IDP women and girls in 
Afghanistan 
0,49113 
Afghanistan Assistance for Refugee Reintegration in Afghanistan 0,48908 
Afghanistan Healthcare and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees 0,48818 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation Center for Afghanistan 0,4607 
Afghanistan TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT TO IMPROVE HEALTH STATUS AND ENSURE THE CONTINUUM 
OF CARE FOR REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN IN EASTERN 
AFGHANISTAN 
0,45569 
Afghanistan Conservation of Qala Ikhtyaruddin, the 15th-Century Citadel of Herat, Phase II 0,45 
Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihoods 0,44535 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Media: Islamic Rights Education 0,442 
Afghanistan Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence And Integrated Social Support For Refugees, Returnees, 
And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan 
0,43572 
Afghanistan Creating Sustainable livelihood opportunities for urban and semi-urban returnees communities in N. 
Afghanistan 
0,426 
Afghanistan Reintegration Program 0,42312 
Afghanistan Agricultural Productivity Enhancement for Afghan Refugees (APEAR) 0,42007 
Afghanistan Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & Internally Displaced Persons in Logar Province 0,39844 
Afghanistan Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & Internally Displaced Persons in Ghazni Province 0,3786 
Afghanistan Humanitraian Mine Clearance 0,36868 
Afghanistan Sustainable livelihoods development for returnees/Afghanistan 0,366 
Afghanistan Support for Repatriating Refugees in 5 Shamoli Districts 0,35326 
Afghanistan Transitional Support To Ensure The Continuum Of Care And Protect The Health Status Of 
Refugees Returnees And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan 
0,34779 
Afghanistan Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - for IDPs in Pawran Province - Afghanistan 0,34092 
Afghanistan GBV Prevention Support Afghanistan 0,33877 
Afghanistan Nangarhar Health Program 0,33149 
Afghanistan Gender Based Violence Prevention South Asia - Afghanistan 0,32658 
Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihoods Development for Returnees/Afghanistan 0,303 
Afghanistan Integrated Return 0,29839 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through Voice of Afghan Women in Global Media] 0,296 
Afghanistan Refugee Assistance 0,27816 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily 0,2746 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Civil Society: Tolerance Caravan 0,27 
Afghanistan Integrated Community-Based Livelihoods, Shelter, And Legal Assistance To Returnees, Internally 
Displaced Persons And Vulnerable Families, Including Vulnerable Women In Afghanistan 
0,26943 
Afghanistan Shelter Project for Displaced Afghans 0,2619 
Afghanistan Kandahar And Jawzjan Integrated And Sustainable Services For Returnees And Host Communities 0,25459 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking [through Voice of Afghan Women ] 0,25 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking [through Afghan Women Skills Development Center ] 0,25 
Afghanistan Prevention of and Response to Gender Based Violence to Returnees and Return Affected 
Communities in Eastern Afghanistan 
0,24626 
Afghanistan Health & Social Resettlement Support to Returnees - Afghanistan 0,24519 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan National Participation Association 0,245 
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Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project Basic Education, Health Promotion, And Leadership 
Development For Women 
0,24339 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to Improve Health, Livelihoods, and Prevention of Gender Based Violence for 
Refugee-Returnees in Eastern Afghanistan 
0,24338 
Afghanistan Kandahar, Kawzjan & Faryab Integrated and Sustainable Services for Returnees and Host 
Communities 
0,23525 
Afghanistan Transition Support Programming for Afghan Refugees in Baluchistan and Haripur 0,23173 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to Returnees families and IDPs - Afghanistan 0,22706 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Institute of Learning 0,22 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Human Rights Organization 0,2169 
Afghanistan Assistance for Refugee Repatriation in Afghanistan 0,21092 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Activities and Social Services Association 0,2108 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to Returnee families & IDP - Afghanistan 0,20619 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return And Reintetration For Afghan Refugees In Urban Areas 0,20265 
Afghanistan GBV Prevention Support - Afghanistan 0,20185 
Afghanistan Prevention of Gender-based Violence and Integrated Social Support for Refugees, Returnees, and 
Other Persons of Concern in Eastern Afghanistan 
0,20155 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking [through International Organization for Migration] 0,2 
Afghanistan Anti-Trafficking in Persons Project [through Afghan Women Skills Development Center] 0,2 
Afghanistan GBV Prevention/Support - Afghanistan 0,19814 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Oruj Learning Center (Afghanistan) for Civic 
Education. 
0,195 
Afghanistan Primary Health Care Program for Afghan Refugees 0,18053 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily for Freedom of Information. 0,18 
Afghanistan Health and Social Resettlement Support to Returnees - Afghanistan 0,17549 
Afghanistan Support And Prevention Of Gbv For Refugees - Eastern Afghanistan 0,15707 
Afghanistan Nangarhar Health Program - Afghanistan 0,15402 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to IDP's 0,15097 
Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities 0,14858 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Development Project 0,14808 
Afghanistan Integrated Afghan Refugee Assistance Program 0,145 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khorasan Legal Services Organization 0,1437 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Oruj Learning Center (Afghanistan) 0,1319 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return, Reintegration And Increased Infrastructure, Opportunities And Skills 
For Returnees In Kabul Province 
0,13087 
Afghanistan Health & Social Resettlement Support to Returness - Afghanistan 0,12932 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections/Civic Participation: Women and Youth 
VOTES 
0,127 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Wakht News Agency 0,1269 
Afghanistan Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - Afghanistan 0,1267 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization 0,124 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Elections/Civic Participation: Cell Phone Voter 
Project: Enhancing Civic Eduation during the Afghan Elections 
0,12 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and 
Children 
0,1193 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to IDPs 0,11835 
Afghanistan Reintegration support to Returnees families & IDPs - Afghanistan 0,11473 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to IDPS 0,11034 
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Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan National Participation Association for 
Democratic Ideas and Values. 
0,109 
Afghanistan Reintegration support to improve health, livelihoods, and provention of Gender Based Violence for 
refugee - returnees to E. Afghanistan 
0,10662 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization 0,1059 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Study Center 0,104 
Afghanistan Preservation and Protection of the Ruins of the 9th-Century Mosque of Noh Gonbad 0,1 
Afghanistan Integrated Assistance to Young Women Return 0,09964 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau 0,098 
Afghanistan EMPOWERING REFUGEE RETURNEE AND OTHER SOCIALLY-EXCLUDED WOMEN IN 
AFGHANISTAN THORUGH SUSTAINABLE AGRIBUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES AND REIGHTS-
BASED ACTIVITIES IN PARWAN, NAHGARHAR & HEART PROVINCES 
0,09602 
Afghanistan Hamsaya Project: Supporting Sustainable Refugees Return 0,096 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation Center for Afghanistan for NGO 
Strengthening. 
0,095 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Health and Development Center for Afghan Women 0,0938 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Network 0,09095 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project - Afghanistan 0,0884 
Afghanistan Healthcare Gender Based Violence and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees 0,08656 
Afghanistan Health Project for Returnees 0,08643 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center 0,0851 
Afghanistan Sustainable Livelihood Opportunties 0,085 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Women Support Association 0,0846 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Hasht-e Subh Daily (Afghanistan) 0,0846 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to National Maliks Association 0,0842 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education 0,0828 
Afghanistan Restoration of the 19th-century Goldasta Mosque in Kabul 0,0827 
Afghanistan Primary Healthcare and Repatriation Support for Afghan Refugees in Northwest Frontier Province 
Pakistan 
0,08052 
Afghanistan Nangahar Health Program 0,0803 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Institute for War and Peace Reporting 0,08 
Afghanistan Improving the lives of Afghan Female Returnees in Kabul Province, Afghanistan 0,07971 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khorasan Legal Services Organization for Rule of 
Law. 
0,0785 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Institute for War and Peace Reporting for Freedom of 
Information. 
0,076 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Human Rights Organization for Rule of 
Law. 
0,075 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation for Peace and Unity 0,075 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Western Afghan Women's Network 0,0746 
Afghanistan GBV Prevention South Asia - Afghanistan 0,07342 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Wakht News Agency for Freedom of Information. 0,07 
Afghanistan Shelter for vulnerable refugees 0,06984 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services 0,0654 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Education Productions Organization for 
Democratic Ideas and Values. 
0,0653 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization 
for Accountability. 
0,0635 
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Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women and Youths for Peace and Development 
Organization 
0,0627 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Centre for Poor Women and 
Girls in Afghanistan for Rule of Law. 
0,062 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Association for Relief and Development 
Actions (WARDA) for Civic Education. 
0,062 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Centre for Poor Women and 
Girls in Afghanistan 
0,0613 
Afghanistan Reduced Vulnerability Of Returnees 0,0612 
Afghanistan Gender Based Violence Prevention Support Afghanistan 0,06112 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and 
Children for Rule of Law. 
0,0605 
Afghanistan Community based primary and reproductive health services for Afghan refugees and host 
communities in Baluchistan, Pakistan 
0,06 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Marefat Civil Capacity Building Organization 0,06 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project Afghanistan 0,05968 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education 
for Civic Education. 
0,0594 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Activities and Social Services Association for 
Civic Education. 
0,058 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghans for Civil Society 0,055 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Kabul Pressistan 0,055 
Afghanistan Sustainable Family Improvement Project/Afghan 0,05493 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization for 
Human Rights. 
0,0537 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Center for Policy Priorities (CFPP) 0,053 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational & Training Centre for Poor Women and 
Girls in Afghanistan 
0,0509 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women Association for Relief and Development 
Actions (WARDA) 
0,0507 
Afghanistan Conservation of Khoja Rokhband Cistern Complex in Herat 0,05 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Justice for All Organization for Rule of Law. 0,05 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Welfare Association for Development of Afghanistan 
for Strengthening Political Institutions. 
0,05 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Legal and Cultural Services for Afghan Women and 
Children (LCSAWC) 
0,0496 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Cooperation for Peace and Unity (Afghanistan) 0,047 
Afghanistan Emergency Refugee Assistance: Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence And Integrated Social 
Support For Refugees, Returnees, And Other Persons Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan 
0,04669 
Afghanistan Health Care Project for Afghan Refugees 0,04657 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center for Civic 
Education. 
0,0465 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Development Organization for New Afghanistan 0,0455 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Social Services for Afghan Women Organization 
(SSAWO) 
0,0451 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Vital Voices Global Partnership 0,04507 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Educational and Training Center for Poor Women and 
Girls of Afghanistan (ECW) 
0,045 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Justice for All Organization 0,045 
Afghanistan Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & IDPs in Ghazni Province 0,0439 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Modern Organization for Development of Education 0,043 
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(MODE) 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Forensic Assistance (Human Rights): Securing 
Afghanistan's Past 
0,04252 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women's Resource Center (AWRC) 0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Women Services and Education 
Organization 
0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghans for Progressive Thinking 0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Khadija Kubra Women Association for Culture 0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to PACT Communications 0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Women and Youths for Peace and Development 
Organization (Afghanistan) 
0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services for Civic Education. 0,04 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Training Human Rights Association for Afghan 
Women 
0,0395 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Development Organization for New Afghanistan 
(DONA) for Civic Education. 
0,0384 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Training Human Rights Association for Afghan 
Women (THRA) 
0,037 
Afghanistan Nangahar Health Project 0,03673 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghan Women Services and Education Organization 
(AWSE) 
0,03645 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Western Afghan Women's Network for Rule of Law. 0,036 
Afghanistan Health Project for Afghan Refugees 0,03577 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Faanoos Magazine 0,0356 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services (Afghanistan) 0,0351 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Development Foundation (ADF) 0,0333 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Herat Professionals Shura 0,0325 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to Internally Displaced Persons 0,03249 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Equality Social and Cultural Organization 0,0319 
Afghanistan Transition Support Programming for Afghan Refugees 0,0301 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Worker Women Social Organization 0,0258 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Youth Educational Services (YES) 0,0255 
Afghanistan Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - Afghanistan 0,02513 
Afghanistan Ambassador's Fund Activity - Funding for Embassy Kabul to fund HOLD 0,02497 
Afghanistan Job Training and Placements for Refugee returnee women in Herat 0,0249 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Organization Women Arise 0,024 
Afghanistan National Endowment for Democracy Grant to Afghanistan Organization Women Arise for Civic 
Education. 
0,0204 
Afghanistan Ambassador's Fund Activity - Julia Taft fund for school project 0,02 
Afghanistan Ambassador's Fund Activity - Julia Taft Fund for textile training production 0,01998 
Afghanistan Nangarhar And Laghman Health Project 0,0199 
Afghanistan Developing sustainable livelihood opportunities - Afghanistan 0,01856 
Afghanistan Nangarhar Health Program (Afghanstan) 0,00998 
Afghanistan Consolidated Support for Afghan Returnees & IDPs in Logar Province 0,00928 
Afghanistan Women's Education Economic Opportunity Program 0,00583 
Afghanistan Integrated return 0,00521 
Afghanistan Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program - Human Rights / Rule of Law: Increasing Women's 
Rights and Access to Justice 
0,00473 
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Afghanistan Integrated return central region 0,00462 
Afghanistan Developing Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities - for Internally Displaced Persons in Pawran 
Province - Afghanistan 
0,00357 
Afghanistan Shelter Community Infrastructure - Afghans 0,00264 
Afghanistan Hamsaya Project 0,00202 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support to Families- Afghanistan 0,00199 
Afghanistan Kabul National Museum Support 0,00064 
Afghanistan Operational Capacity for Afgan Returns 0,00058 
Afghanistan Nicra Adj. for BEFARE Afghan Refugee Camp School Ops in NWFP 0,00033 
Afghanistan Reproductive Healthcare among Afghan Refugees 0,00009 
Afghanistan Health Assistance 0,00006 
Afghanistan Assistance for Afghan Refugees 0,00002 
Afghanistan Reintegration of Displaced Afghans 0,00001 
Afghanistan Capacity-Building for the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation of Afghanistan 0 
Afghanistan Close-out Adjustment - Community-Based Participation Program in Afghanistan on Elimination of 
Gender-Based Violence and Promoting Participation of Women and Girls in Decision Making and 
Income Generation 
0 
Afghanistan Contribution To International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s 2012 Emergency Appeal For 
Afghanistan 
0 
Afghanistan Empowering Refugee Returnee and other socially-excluded women in Afghanistan through 
sustainable agribusiness opportunities and Rights-based activities in Parwan, Nahgarhar & Herat 
Provinces 
0 
Afghanistan Supporting Sustainable Return And Reintegration For Afghan Refugees In Urban Areas 0 
Afghanistan Emergency Refugee Assistance: Prevention of Gender-based Violence and Integrated Social 
Support for Refugees, Returnees, and Other Persons of Concern in Eastern Afghanistan 
0 
Afghanistan Support And Prevention Of Gender-Based Violence For Refugees, Returnees And Other Persons 
Of Concern In Eastern Afghanistan 
0 
Afghanistan Transitional Support To Ensure The Continuum Of Care And Protect The Health Status Of 
Refugees, Returnees And Other Persons Of Concen In Eastern Afghanistan 
0 
Afghanistan Transitional Support to Improve Health Status and Ensure the Continuum of Care for Refugee, 
Returnees and other persons of concern in Eastern Afghanistan 
0 
Afghanistan Close-out of FY07 Agreement for Afghan reintegration support to returnee families and Internally 
Displaced Persons 
0 
Afghanistan Strengthening Resilience Of Returnees, Afghanistan: Improved Access To Wash Facilities And 
Provision Of Economic Opportunities To The Returnees In 04 Districts Of Nangarhar Province-
Afghanistan. 
0 
Afghanistan Prevention Of And Response To Gender Based Violence To Returnees And Return Affected 
Communities In Eastern Afghanistan 
−0,01108 
Afghanistan Reintegration Support To Improve Health, Livelihoods, And Provention Of Gender Based Violence 
For Refugee - Returnees To E. Afghanistan 
−0,01141 
Afghanistan Agricultural Productivity Enhancement For Afghan Refugees (Apear) −0,0176 
Afghanistan OS-OGHA: Afghanistan Health Initiative 17,594 
Afghanistan Polio Eradication. Oral Polio Vaccine purchase through UNICEF. 5,9035 
Afghanistan Polio Eradication. Technical assistance grants to UNICEF. 4,49178 
Afghanistan CDC: Reduce Maternal and Child Health M&M 2,48131 
Afghanistan Polio Eradication through the World Health Organization. 1,80749 
Afghanistan CDC: FELTP 1,05488 
Afghanistan President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - F Operational Plan Programs 0,36815 
Afghanistan Global Measles Immunization Initiatives through the World Health Organization. 0,35894 
Afghanistan CDC: Influenza 0,12077 
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Afghanistan CDC: Surveillance & Capacity Building Activites 0,12077 
Afghanistan President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - Country Programs 0,11731 
Afghanistan CDC Mine Action Related Country Activities 0,1 
Afghanistan SAMHSA: Establishing a model of behavioral health services for rural and underserved areas 0,051 
Afghanistan OS-OGHA: OS-OGHA: Afghanistan Health Initiative 0,02716 
Afghanistan CDC: OTHER GLOBAL HEALTH (POST HELD) 0,00055 
Afghanistan CDC: GLOBAL HEALTH FEDERAL REIMBURSABLE ACTIVITY (POST) 0,00001 
Afghanistan CDC: Global Measles Immunization Initiatives through the World Health Organization. 0 
Afghanistan CDC: Polio Eradication through the World Health Organization. 0 
Afghanistan CDC: Technical assistance sustainability and capacity building. 0 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Agriculture/Irrigation 74,7302 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Healthcare 21,31886 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities 10,14923 
Afghanistan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): Food Production and Distribution 2,30824 
Afghanistan President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - F Operational Plan Programs 0,01 
Afghanistan Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock's Capacity-Building and Change-
Management Program; Trilateral Working Groups 
86,3 
Afghanistan Total Cost of Food Aid under Food For Progress Title I, Commodity Credit Corporation Purchase 
Program 
20,54625 
Afghanistan Reconstruction and Stabilization Agricultural Advisors in Afghanistan 15,35 
Afghanistan Agricultural Developmnet for Afghansitan Pre-deployment Training (ADAPT) 1,14012 
Afghanistan Agricultural Data Collection and Utilization System 0,29706 
Afghanistan Reduced Interest: Agriculture - PL-480 0,24474 
Total  3034,51859 
 
